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Douglas MacArthur's Occupation of Japan: Building the Foundation of U.S.-Japan 
Relationship 
The United States occupied Japan for seven years immediately after the World War 
II. Designated as the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, General Douglas 
MacArthur directed the occupation mission with absolute authority. The primary 
purpose of the occupation was to disarm Japan and to punish the war criminals so that 
Japan would never again be a menace to the Allied countries. However, through the 
research mainly from MacArthur Papers of the MacArthur Memorial, William 
Manchester's American Caesar, and Embracing Defeat by John Dower, it was found 
that the humanitarian activities of the American occupation troops and MacArthur's 
democratization programs saved the millions of Japanese people's lives. MacArthur's 
wisdom in taking Japanese people's sentiments into account in every decision he 
made also helped the occupation mission proceed smoothly and successfully. 
Although the occupation began as a consequence of defeat in war, it helped to 
rebuild the nation from devastation. MacArthur reformed the economic structure to 
encourage the Japanese economy to be self-sufficient, gave food aid for the Japanese 
suffering from hunger, and liberated them from their slavery status in their feudalistic 
social system. One of MacArthur's great achievements was revising the Japanese 
constitution by adopting the American executive system and British parliamentary 
system. The new constitution liberated women and gave them equal status to men, 
liberated the education system, and renounced war. After sixty years, this constitution 
has never been amended. 
Within a few years, Japanese economy rebounded, and industry grew rapidly in 
response to the Korean War. The occupation ended with the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty in 1952, and the Allied countries gave Japan sovereignty. Even though the 
people of the two countries fought a brutal war in the Pacific, the United States and 
Japan established a strong tie during the seven years of occupation. Japan emerged 
from the occupation a strong ally of the United States. Thus, the relationship between 
the U.S. and Japan, which remains strong and influential, is the great legacy of 
Douglas MacArthur. 
Chairperson: Michael S. Mayer 
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Introduction 
Japan is one of the most advanced countries in the world—the second largest 
economy after the United States, measured on an exchange rate basis.' It achieved 
remarkably rapid success after losing a war with devastating damage. However, one 
cannot forget the fact that the United States played a significant role in Japan's 
postwar recovery. It would not have been possible without the aid of the United States 
and General Douglas MacArthur's guidance during the seven years of occupation 
after the World War II. 
Historians have credited MacArthur with the creation of a stable, democratic 
government in Japan, with rebuilding its economy, with the modernization of its 
society, with the liberation of its women, and with forging a close relationship 
between Japan and the United States that has lasted to this day. Based in research in 
MacArthur Papers, this thesis supports those general conclusions. 
After Japan surrendered on August 15, 1945, the Allied countries, led by the 
United States, occupied Japan for nearly seven years—longer than the actual war 
between the U.S. and Japan—until the San Francisco Peace Treaty came into force on 
April 28, 1952. Immediately following the surrender of Japan, American President 
Harry Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur as the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers (SCAP). In that capacity, MacArthur directed the General 
Headquarters (GHQ) in Tokyo and supervised the occupation programs in Japan. 
Besides the primary aim of demobilization, one of the biggest missions for MacArthur 
was to bring American democracy into a traditional, imperialistic country, in which 
people worshipped the Emperor as a living God. The current status of Japan in the 
1 CIA, The World Factbook, 
http7/www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/ja.html 
1 
modem world is a legacy of MacArthur's successful democratization, which includes 
forming the foundation of rapid economic growth and modernization of the 
constitution. 
As the Supreme Commander, MacArthur had absolute authority over all 
Japanese, even the government and the Emperor. He effectively used his power not 
only to disarm the Imperial Army and punish the war criminals but also to help the 
Japanese to recover from the aftermath of the war—poverty, starvation and despair. 
Moreover, MacArthur supervised the writing of a new modem constitution, which 
controversially renounced war and the possession of any military capacity other than 
for self defense. Additionally, the new constitution granted women equal rights to men 
for the first time in Japanese history. 
The two main accounts of MacArthur's role in this transformation agree that 
the General had a free hand in formulating policy for the occupation. As Dobbins 
argues, MacArthur could largely ignore or maneuver around the supervisory 
commissions.^ Dower points out the U.S. tendency to focus on the occupation of 
Germany and the political situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe also left 
MacArthur with a freehand to make decisions.^ Indeed, on the day of Japanese 
surrender. President Tmman declared that the authority of the Emperor and Japanese 
Govemment to mle the state will be subject to MacArthur as a Supreme Commander."^ 
He actually took over the initiative of drafting the constitution when he found out that 
the Japanese Govemment was incapable to propose revisions that he wanted.^ 
2 James Dobbins, John G. McGinn, Keith Crane, Seth G. Jones, Rohe Lai, Andrew 
Rathmell, Rachel M. Swanger, Anga Timilsina, America's Role in Nation-Building-
From Germany to Iraq, California, Rand, 2003, p.29. 
3 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat! Japan in the Wake of World War II, New York, 
WW. Norton & Company, 1999, p.79. 
Department of States, Occupation ofJapan  ̂Policy and Progress, Far Eastern Series 
17, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub.267, 1946, pp.88-89. 
5 William Manchester, American Caesar- Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, New York, 
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Through all the reconstruction programs, the Japanese economy recovered 
and got stronger within a few decades, and Japan was remodeled to be one of the most 
loyal and supportive allies of the United States. Both Dower and Dobbins maintain 
that Japan's postwar growth was made possible by MacArthur's work during the 
occupation.^ That growth would never happened if the United States had not 
supported the reconstruction of Japan after the war. Furthermore, the recovery would 
not have been so dramatic without MacArthur's drastic reforms. MacArthur's tactics 
enabled the occupation to succeed in a short period of time. Especially right after the 
barbarous, brutal war in the Pacific, in which people of the both sides hated each other, 
the success of the occupation of Japan was noteworthy. MacArthur's work made a 
significant contribution in changing the attitudes of both the Americans and the 
Japanese toward each other and accomplished to build a new relationship which still 
remains strong. 
In addition to MacArthur's wisdom in conducting the mission, historians 
have noted several key conditions during the occupation of Japan that contributed to 
its success: the Japanese culture that emphasized obedience to a divine ruler; the 
desperate situation Japan found itself in immediately after the war; the practically sole 
occupation by the United States, and absolute authority of MacArthur, as well as his 
charismatic personality. All of them helped MacArthur make his mission successful. 
Also, MacArthur's efforts to rebuild Japan moved the policy makers in Washington to 
pay more attention to the situation in the Asia-Pacific region, which became one of 
the great national interests of the United States as the cold war developed. 
Dower and Manchester have pointed to the significance of the unquestioned 
obedience of the Japanese people to a divine ruler. Dower notes that the GHQ 
Laurel Book, 1978, p.588. 
® Dower, p. 551. J Dobbins, p.14. 
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instructed their officials about the Japanese people that they were trained to play 
"follow-the-leader." ̂  MacArthur's psychological-warfare adviser, Bonner Fellers 
argued that Emperor worship of the Japanese people was one of the significant 
aspects that the GHQ officials had to consider.^ MacArthur also noted, in his 
reminiscences, that "This God-Emperor was absolute. His word was final. 
Dower and Dobbins have noted that the devastation of Japan's industrial base, 
the devastation of its cities, the scarcity of food, etc. provided MacArthur with 
favorable conditions to reconstruct Japanese society. Dobbins argues that the U.S. 
saved millions of the Japanese during the first stage of the postwar years. 
Manchester noted that the sanitation campaign by a Public-Health section saved 2.1 
million Japanese lives." Without the humanitarian aid by the U.S., millions of 
Japanese people would have died in starvation. Japanese nationals expressed their 
12 appreciation by writing letters to MacArthur. Through those activities in the initial 
stage of the occupation, MacArthur successfully made a favorable impression on the 
Japanese people and won their cooperation. That made the latter occupation go more 
smoothly and quickly. 
Finally, MacArthur's broad authority combined with his charismatic 
personality to make him an ideal figure to head the occupation. His own imperial 
bearing and style fit perfectly with the Japanese cultural tendency towards deference. 
Historians such as Dower and Manchester have noted this. Their observations are 
bom out by the Japanese people's practice of sending letters to MacArthur expressing 
Dower, p.215. 
8 Ibid., pp.283-284. 
9 MacArthiu-, Reminiscences, pp.283-284. 
10 Dobbins, p.37. 
Manchester, p.601. 
12 Rinjiro Sodei, Dear General MacArthur, Boston, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 
2001, p.123. 
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their gratitude and respects for him that proved that the Japanese nationals were 
13 attracted by MacArthur's graciousness and charisma. 
MacArthur had spent much of his adult life in Asia, and he thought he knew 
Asians and, by extension, the Japanese. In fact, as Dower and Manchester have 
pointed out, MacArthur's view of Asians was paternalistic and even racist. Dower 
notes that MacArthur said "Asia was culturally and politically backward." 
Moreover, MacArthur knew Asia in general, and the Philippines in particular, a good 
deal better than Japan. At least initially, his understanding of Japan depended heavily 
on briefing papers prepared for him when he got ready to assume his position as 
commander of the occupation. Bonner Fellers, who wrote several of those papers, 
gave MacArthur "a fifteen-point mantra" that explained Japanese behavior patterns.'^ 
MacArthur was a remarkably quick study, but his ability to absorb briefing papers did 
not provide him with an in depth knowledge of Japan or its people. Further, while the 
MacArthur Papers contain no instances of what, at least by the standards of the 1940s, 
might considered outright racism, they do reveal elements of paternalism and racial 
stereotyping typical of MacArthur's time and background. As Dower has pointed out, 
to MacArthur, Japan was a backward country and the Japanese people needed to be 
civilized with the idea of democracy. In a speech he made when he returned to the 
U.S., MacArthur said the Japanese "would be like a boy of twelve," and were in a 
17 tuitionary condition, compared to "the Anglo-Saxon, [who] was 45 years of age." 
When this statement became public, it diminished the respect and gratitude the 
Japanese had for MacArthur. 
13 Manchester, p.556. 
14 Dower, p.286. 
15 pp.283-284. 
16 Ibid., p.213. 
1'^ U.S. Senate, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee 
on Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, May 1951, Part I, esp. p.312. 
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The seven years of occupation was a significant event for both Japan and the 
United States because it served as the origin of the foundation of the current 
U.S.-Japan relationship, which is very important in terms of security, economy, and 
technology. When Japan regained the sovereignty by signing the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty in 1951, the United States and Japan also signed a Mutual Security Assistance 
Pact in which the two countries agreed to ensure continued U.S. access to the 
American bases in Japan in retum for U.S. protection of Japan in the event Japan was 
attacked. This treaty has been a significant pillar of the U.S.-Japan relationship ever 
since, bonding the two countries together to maintain the security against threats in 
18 the Asia-Pacific region. 
It is worthwhile to ponder MacArthur's role in Japan because his legacy is 
still alive. For example, the Japanese have never amended the constitution that 
MacArthur imposed, though the interpretation of Article 9 has been frequently 
debated, and dissatisfaction among the Japanese with the American military presence 
throughout Japan has been growing. Although sixty years have passed since the end of 
the war and there are not very many survivors of that era alive any more, it is 
important now to reconsider what people experienced during and after the war, and 
what we have now because of the hard times they lived through. Thus, it is also a duty 
of those who survived to tell the story of this significant period to subsequent 
generations to help them understand the origins of what they have now and reconsider 
the importance of the U.S.-Japan relationship. 
18 Wikipedia, Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States 
and Japan, 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wikiyTreaty_of_Mutual_Cooperation_and_Security_between_t 
he_United_States_and_Japan 
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1. The Aims of the Occupation 
After the devastation of two cities by atomic bombs, the Japanese Imperial 
Government finally agreed to surrender on August 10, 1945. Following Emperor 
Hirohito's acceptance of the surrender, the Allies officially launched an occupation 
program in Japan. The primary aim of the occupation was to disarm, demilitarize, and 
democratize Japan to insure that Japan would not again become a menace to the 
United States or a threat to the peace and security of the world. The United States 
Initial Post Surrender Policy for Japan stated their objectives: 
The ultimate objectives of the United States in regard to Japan to 
which policies in the initial period must conform are to insure that Japan will 
not again become a menace to the United States or to the peace and security 
of the world, and to bring about the eventual establishment of a peaceful and 
responsible government which will respect the rights of other states and will 
support the objectives of the United States as reflected in the ideals and 
principles of the charter of the United Nations. The United States desires that 
this government should conform as closely as may be to principles of 
democratic self govemment but it is not the responsibility of the Allied 
Powers to impose upon Japan any form of government not supported by the 
freely expressed will of the people. 
President Harry Truman designated General Douglas MacArthur as the 
Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers on August 14, 1945, with the approval of 
Clement Attlee of Britain, Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, and Chiang Kai-shek of 
China. President Truman directed MacArthur that: 
"From the moment of surrender, the authority of the Emperor and 
Japanese Govemment to rule the state will be subject to you and you will 
take such steps as you deem proper to effectuate the surrender terms. You 
will exercise supreme command over all land, sea and air forces which may 
be allocated for enforcement in Japan of the surrender terms by the Allied 
19 Douglas MacArthur, Reports of General MacArthur- Japanese Operations in the 
Southwest Pacific Area, Vol.1, Supplement- MacArthur in Japan'- The Occupation, 
Military Phase, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966, p.195. 
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Powers concerned."^® 
Thus, MacArthur gained absolute authority over Japan. Even the Emperor and the 
prime minister were subordinate to him, not to mention all Japanese citizens. 
American officials made it clear that the Japanese were to take the initiatives 
in governmental matters with the supervision of the Allied Powers. Since they 
occupied Japan in order to build a democratic country, it was the official stance of the 
Allies to respect the will of the Japanese people, and let them lead their own recovery 
process. However, as soon as the Allies found out the existing political and 
economical structures had collapsed, MacArthur assumed authority over these areas.^' 
As the Supreme Commander, MacArthur pursued a number of objectives of 
the occupation, including demilitarization, punishing war criminals, building the 
structure of representative government, modernizing the constitution, holding free 
elections, enfranchising women, releasing political prisoners, liberating the farmers, 
establishing a free labor movement, encouraging a free economy, abolishing police 
oppression, developing a free and responsible press, liberalizing education, 
decentralizing political power, and separating religion from the state.^^ He intended 
to transform a small, feudalistic country in Asia, into a modem, democratic country. 
Within only two months, MacArthur reported on the achievements of initial 
occupation objectives. Demobilization went unexpectedly smoothly and quickly 
because of the cooperation by the Japanese government and submissive Japanese 
nationals under the mandate of the Emperor to obey the occupation troops. In a radio 
address to the American people on October 15, 1945, MacArthur declared the 
20 Department of States, Occupation of Japan-' Policy and Progress, Far Eastern 
Series 17, Washington D.C., U.S. Government Printing Office, Pub.267, 1946, 
pp.88-89. 
21 WiUiam Manchester, American Caesar- Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964, New York, 
Laiu-el Book, 1978, p.588. 
22 Douglas MacArthvir, Reminiscences, New York, McGrawHUl Book Company, 1964. 
pp.282-283. 
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completion of the demobilization program. He proudly proclaimed that "Today, the 
Japanese Armed Forces throughout Japan completed their demobilization and ceased 
to exist as such. These forces are now completely abolished. I know of no 
demobilization in history, either in war or in peace, by our own or by any other 
country, that has been accomplished so rapidly or so frictionlessly. Everything military, 
naval or air is forbidden in Japan."^^ 
Thus, the most important, urgent aim of the occupation was accomplished 
surprisingly smoothly and quickly. All the democratization programs followed this in 
the next seven years. 
23 MacArthiir, Reports of General MacArthur, Vol.1. Supp. p. 131., GHQ USAFPAC 
Press Release, October 15, 1945. 
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2. The Structure of the Occupation 
Administrative Structure To accomplish the aims of the occupation, the 
fmal terms proclaimed at the Potsdam Declaration on July 26, 1945, the Allies—the 
United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union—agreed to a joint 
occupation of Japan, once it surrendered. However, because of its predominant role in 
the fmal stages of the war against Japan in the Pacific, the United States took the lead 
in the occupation of Japan. Immediately, the United States planned to call for 600,000 
troops and anticipated that this would include 315,000 American, 135,000 British 
Commonwealth, 60,000 Chinese, and 175,000 Soviet troops, all under the U.S. 
command. Yet, these numbers were later revised, and neither the Soviets nor the 
Chinese ever contributed forces after all. So, in the end, only the countries of the 
British Commonwealth shared occupation responsibilities with the United States by 
providing with 45,000 troops.^'^ 
The United States agreed to form two international bodies for oversight of 
GHQ—the Far Eastern Commission (FEC) and the Allied Council for Japan (ACJ). 
Established in February of 1946, the FEC consisted of representatives from 11 
countries that fought against Japan—Australia, Canada, China, France, India, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Philippines, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and 
the United States. Its role was to formulate policies to enable Japan to fulfill its 
surrender terms and to review MacArthur's directives and the actions of the 
occupation forces. In fact, even though designed as a supervisory body, the FEC had 
no effective power over making policy, because it was dominated by the United States, 
China, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union. Although the FEC had the power 
24 Theodore Cohen, Remaking Japan: The American Occupation as New Deal, New 
York, The Free Press, 1987, p.60. 
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to override MacArthur on the issue of constitutional revision and exercised some 
influence on the content of the final document, MacArthur could largely ignore or 
maneuver around the commission.^^ 
Like the FEC, the ACJ was not an effective instrument. Composed of the 
United States, the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union, the ACJ was 
established in April of 1946 to consult and advise GHQ. The ACJ could not function 
effectively because MacArthur, whose representative served as the ACJ's chair, was 
not obligated to consult with it or accept its advice, and in fact chose not to do so. 
Thus, the occupation of Japan was actually conducted by the American officials. 
Furthermore, the attention of American policy makers in Washington D.C. tended to 
focus on the occupation of Germany and the political situation in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe in the postwar period. It thus left MacArthur with an unusually 
freehand to make decisions regarding the occupation of Japan.^^ Ultimately, although 
it was seen as the "Allied occupation," the United States effectively exercised 
unilateral control over all the occupation process. In other words, it was MacArthur's 
occupation. 
How GHQ Functioned MacArthur created a headquarters that was 
responsible for nonmilitary matters, in particular the democratization of Japan. The 
headquarters initially had nine sections, including the Government Section, the 
Economic and Scientific Section, the Natural Resources Section, and the Civil 
Information and Education Section. These were established to be roughly parallel in 
structure to the Japanese cabinet, so they could make use of existent institution 
efficiently with the guidance of GHQ officials. The GHQ staffs were mostly 
25 Dobbins, p.29. 
26 Dower, p.79. 
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American civil servants and officers who converted to civilian status. At its peak in 
1948, it employed nearly 3,500 people. 
In August of 1945, MacArthur ordered the Japanese government to establish 
a liaison office to interact with GHQ. The Central Liaison Office was established in 
Tokyo and staffed by the Foreign Ministry of Japan. Liaison offices were also set up 
in each prefecture to serve local military government teams. The Central Liaison 
Office functioned as the primary channel for communication between the special staff 
sections of GHQ and the Japanese government so that the staff sections could 
communicate directly with the Japanese ministries and agencies they oversaw. 
As for security, MacArthur initially estimated he would need between 
200,000 and 600,000 troops in the first six months of occupation to disarm and patrol 
Japan. He ordered the occupation troops to arrive in Japan in two stages. Following 
the Supreme Commander's landing on August 30, the main forces of the U.S. Eighth 
Army, led by General Robert Eichelberger, began coming ashore on September 1 and 
rapidly took up positions in the northern half of the country, from Nagoya to 
Hokkaido. On September 4, the Sixth Army began to arrive at the naval port of 
Sasebo and assumed positions at former Japanese military bases in the southern half 
of the country, led by General Walter Krueger. At the end of 1945, approximately 
354,675 U.S. troops were stationed throughout Japan.^^ 
Food and Public Health Japan had been severely damaged by daily 
bombing raids by the Allies, and people suffered from hunger and material shortages, 
particularly housing. Food and supplies such as clothing and medicines from the 
United States saved millions of the Japanese during the first stage of the postwar 
2'^ Dobbins, p.32. 
28 U.S. War Department, Office of the Adjutant General, Machine Records Branch, 
Washington, D.C., December 1, 1945. in Dobbins' America's Role in Nation-Building. 
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29 years. 
The food shortage was exacerbated by the fact that Japan, which was 
overpopulated and had Hmited arable land, had largely depended on imported food. 
Japan used to import basic food like rice and sugar from Korea, Formosa (Taiwan), 
and China. Imports accounted for 31 percent of Japan's rice consumption, 92 percent 
on 
of its sugar, 58 percent of its soy beans, and 45 percent of its salt. During the war, 
Japan squeezed food from the nations it occupied, especially from Korea. As a result, 
Korea suffered from starvation. The Japanese used Korea as a "bread basket" and 
Formosa as a "sugar bowl."^" 
However, with the outbreak of the war against the Allies in the Pacific, 
Japanese lines of trade were blocked by the Allied countries, creating shortages of 
food and raw materials which were essential for fighting a war. The shortage of 
supplies was one of the main reasons for Japan's defeat. Possessed of a strong 
militaristic spirit, Japanese soldiers were still eager to fight to the end of their lives, 
but, physically, it was impossible for them to keep fighting any longer. Starvation 
became a major cause of death among Japanese soldiers. On the home front as well, 
the Japanese people suffered from malnutrition and starvation. Crime rates were 
noticeably higher in the first post suirender years than ever before, because of hunger 
and material shortages, people committed robbery and theft all over Japan. The yearly 
average for arrests counted 9,485 for robbery and 1,177,184 for theft in the period 
between 1946 and 1949.^^ 
In 1945, food supplies were severely limited worldwide, not only in Japan. 
The U.S. Air Force began dropping relief supplies of food, medicines, and clothing 
29 Dobbins, p.37. 
30 Dower, p.91. 
31 MacArthur Papers, The MacArthur Memorial, Norfolk, Virginia, RG-5, Reel #25. 
32 Dower, p. 109. 
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over the camps that held Allied prisoners in Japan as early as August 25, even before 
the occupation troops started landing. However, feeding the Japanese, the former 
enemy, was a low priority for the Allies. The White House ordered MacArthur to limit 
Japanese food relief to what was needed to prevent a level of disease and unrest that 
could endanger the occupation forces and interfere with GHQ operations. Imports of 
fuel and medicines were also kept at subsistence levels. Opposing this order of the 
government, MacArthur insisted that Japan must get back on its feet, with the 
standard of living of 1926 to 1930—a peaceful, non-militaristic period in Japan. To 
avoid possible chaos and opposition to the occupation programs stemming from 
hunger and material shortages, the General asked the U.S. Government to give more 
money for the food relief or more forces. "Give me bread or give me bullets," he 
demanded.^^ His budget request of 1946-47 included $250 million for food, fertilizer, 
petroleum products, and medicines, and, indeed, he got it.^"* 
Occupation troops were forbidden to consume local food or supplies; they 
would eat only their own rations. The Japanese were surprised because they never 
thought the enemy would help them out; instead they thought the Allied troops would 
take away their food and scarce supplies just like their own troops did in countries the 
Japanese had occupied. MacArthur said, "The first step in the reformation of Japan 
w o u l d  b e  a n  e x h i b i t i o n  o f  g e n e r o s i t y  a n d  c o m p a s s i o n  b y  t h e  o c c u p y i n g  p o w e r . T h e  
attitude was evident on street comers, where children were soon playing and running 
around American soldiers who gave away chocolates and chewing gum from the jeeps. 
It did not take long for kids to learn a phrase of English "Give me chocolate!"^^ 
Besides providing food aid, MacArthur created a Public-Health section 
33 Manchester, p.544.; MacArthur, Reminiscences, p.307. 
34 Dobbins, p.37. 
35 Manchester, p.524. 
36 Dower, p. 110. 
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headed by an army physician. Dr. Crawford Sams. Sams conducted a national 
sanitation campaign, followed by a massive immunization and vaccination program. 
At the end of the campaign, cholera had been wiped out; deaths from tuberculosis 
were down by 88 percent, from diphtheria by 86 percent, from dysentery by 86 
percent, and from typhoid by 90 percent. In the first years of the occupation, Sams 
estimated, the control of communicable diseases alone had saved 2.1 million Japanese 
lives—more than the country's battle deaths during the war, and over three times the 
number of Japanese civilians killed in the wartime bombings including Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki. Thanks to the nation-wide sanitation campaign, the life expectancy of 
Japanese men increased by eight years and of women by nearly fourteen years. The 
Public-Health section also instructed schools to teach proper dietary principles and 
served pupils balanced meals.^^ 
In addition to the aid from the occupation troops, Japan received huge 
amount of financial help from the United States Government. This included $1.6 
billion of aid from Government Appropriation for Relief In Occupied Area 
(GARIOA), which provided civilians of the occupied countries with financial aid by 
the U.S. Ministry of Army for the use of medicine and food; $200 million from 
Economic Rehabilitation in Occupied Area (EROA) which was to help them obtain 
raw materials such as coal or mine, in order to support economic and industrial 
38 rehabilitation of the occupied countries. Japanese residents in the United States also 
sent food gifts to Japan through Licensed Agencies for Relief of Asia (LARA). The 
food aid from the U.S. saved more than 11 million Japanese from malnutrition and 
possible starvation during the hardest time of the postwar.^^ 
3'^ Manchester, p.601. 
38 http-//ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/GAR10A; httpV/ja.wikipedia.org/wiki/EROA 
39 MacArthur Papers, SCAP, Food Report, 1946, RG-25, Reel #960. 
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Through this humanitarian assistance, MacArthur won appreciation of the 
Japanese people and gave them a highly favorable initial impression of the occupation 
forces. The occupation started effectively through this humanitarian work and helped 
subsequent democratization programs proceed smoothly. 
16 
3. Japanese Reaction after the War 
Towards the Surrender The people of Japan were filled with mixed 
feelings of grief, despair, and disillusionment at the nation's defeat. Some had anger 
against the militaristic leaders for losing the war and others against themselves for 
failing in the war effort. In addition, some had a feeling of intense sympathy for the 
Emperor Hirohito."*^ 
Not until the beginning of Tokyo Tribunal did most of the Japanese people 
know anything about the barbarous atrocities conducted by Japanese soldiers in areas 
they conquered, such as the Philippines and China. When they heard the detailed 
report of the truth for the first time at the opening of the trial, Japanese people were 
shocked. Then, intellectuals began criticizing the militaristic leaders and government 
officials for oppressing the people with nationalistic propaganda. Intellectuals also 
began blaming themselves for being too weak and blind to authority. They argued that 
the Japanese public lacked the courage to oppose or fight against oppression, and that 
the majority of Japanese, deceived by the militaristic leaders, had to bear 
responsibility for "having been stupid." They also blamed themselves, arguing that 
"the leaders alone could not have fought such a large-scale war; we were manipulated, 
and went along into a wrongful war of aggression, and invited miserable defeat. The 
crime is not that of the leaders alone, but rather all of us must bear responsibility."^^ 
The Japanese press also felt ashamed for failing to disclose the nation's 
barbarism abroad. A column of a newspaper noted that "It is shameful that not one 
line of truth was reported in the papers."^^ The Imperial Government controlled 
media coverage and suppressed the expression of political thought against the 
40 yiacAxthw:, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.2, Part 11.̂ . 
Dower, p.505. 
"*2 Asahi Shimbun, Tensei Jingo, July 27, 1946. 
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government. The people were made to believe that the war was for the Emperor and 
preservation of their holy country. Thus, they knew nothing about what was really 
going on, did not know what they were fighting for, and remained ignorant of what 
the war was like. They were even told that Japan was winning until shortly before its 
surrender. Therefore, Japanese citizens experienced profound shock at the news of 
their country's surrender."^^ 
From Fear to Trust Initially, Japanese people were afraid to have the 
occupation troops come to their land. As the nationals of a defeated country, they had 
no choice but to obey the new authority of the Allied officials, but they were afraid. 
Various rumors and gossip circulated about the occupation, such as "American 
soldiers would loot Japan," "Americans would rob Japan of all the food," "Women 
and girls would be violated," "All men would be killed," "What was left of Tokyo 
would be devastated."'^ 
However, being submissive to authority by nature, Japanese public welcomed 
the occupation troops by saluting and bowing at their arrival, which surprised the 
conquerors. Although women and children ran into hiding, there was no sign of civil 
disturbance or resistance against the occupation troops. Mac Arthur recalled that on 
the day GHQ moved from Yokohama to their new headquarters "Dai Ichi Building" in 
Tokyo, the convoy seemed more like a triumphant parade of troops returning home to 
receive the victor's plaudits. The Japanese along the road waved, shouted, bowed, and 
saluted.'*^ 
While they were interacting with the occupation troops, the Japanese public 
gradually became to trust and appreciate their activities in Japan. Contrary to the prior 
43 Dower, p.505. 
Tokyo Yomiuri, Tokyo Shimbun, August 19, 1945 
45 MacArthur, Report of General MacArthur, Vol. 1, Supp. p.31. 
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rumors and gossip, the unexpected friendliness, kindness, and generosity of American 
soldiers impressed the Japanese population.'*'' The Japanese especially appreciated 
MacArthur's order at the beginning of the occupation that the Imperial palace, 
temples, shrines, and historical art objects were off limits to the occupation troops. 
Initially, the U.S. planned to use the bodies of the Japanese war criminals for post 
mortem brain research by the U.S. Army to investigate the correlation of pathological 
or abnormal behavior with certain disease states or processes."*^ But MacArthur also 
48 countermanded it, msisting that using "the similar methods by the Germans," would 
unquestionably shock public opinion not only in Japan, but also back home. 
Considering the psychology of Japanese people, MacArthur insisted at every 
occasion that the occupation troops should leam from the Japanese as well as teach 
them. He considered the occupation troops as "ambassadors of good will." He later 
recalled this approach "had a great deal to do with restoring a sense of dignity and 
purpose in Japanese people, and as they regained self-respect and pride, they 
approached an exchange of ideas with avidity and good will. This mutual respect 
became the foundation of the basic esteem our two peoples came to have for one 
another—and enabled the occupation to write a unique and warmly human chapter of 
world history.That attitude of the General and his troops appealed to the "face 
saving" tradition of the Japanese.^^ Even though Japan was initially a veiy foreign 
country to MacArthur, he had a strong belief in the people of Japan and felt that if 
American troops treated them with respect, they would respond with respect and trust 
Nippon Times, September 4, 1945, Tokyo Shimbun, September 11, 1945. 
47 MacArthur Papers, radiogram dated March 10, 1946, RG-9, Reel#324, radiogram 
between Commander in Chief, United States Air Forces, Pacific (CINCAFPAC) and 
U.S. Army. 
48 Ibid., March 14, 1946. 
49 MacArthxir, Reminiscences, p.283. 
50 MacArthiir, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.1, Supp. p.51. 
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and obey the occupation authorities. With his analysis supported by his advisers such 
as Bonner Fellers, who specialized in Japanese people's psychology, MacArthur 
ordered his troops to treat the Japanese with respect, even though they were former 
enemies. The old authoritarian background of the Japanese contrasted with the free, 
liberal philosophy of the American forces. Adjustments had to be made and 
sometimes led to misunderstanding and confusion. However, because of the eagerness 
of the Japanese to adapt themselves to occidental methods and recover during the 
war's aftermath, MacArthur later noted that "the adjustment proved far less difficult 
than had been anticipated."^' 
MacArthur's effective attempts to respond to the Japanese psychic, with 
useful suggestions by Fellers, helped to sustain mutual respect and trust between the 
Japanese and the occupation forces after the onset of the occupation. On the third 
anniversary of the end of the war, Prime Minister Hitoshi Ashida declared that 
Japanese people saw hope in the future of their country and expressed gratitude to the 
occupation work. "While our living is not by any means easy, it is steadily 
improving... This situation has been made possible by the combined efforts of all the 
Japanese people. At the same time, we must never forget the thorough and painstaking 
guidance and colossal material aid of the Allied powers."^^ 
The other reason Japanese nationals received the victors submissively was 
they were ordered to do so by the Emperor. His word was absolute for Japanese 
citizens, "his loyal subjects." Long imbued with a belief he was divine, they loyally 
obeyed the Emperor's directions that the Japanese people must obey the terms of 
surrender and must work toward regaining the trust and faith of the world by 
51 Ibid., p.49. 
52 Ibid., p.22. 
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"enduring the unendurable, bearing the unbearable."^^ The Emperor's admonition 
was part of an imperial rescript issued on the day of surrender, August 15, 1945. It 
was broadcast nationwide by radio, and the Japanese citizens heard him speak for the 
first time.^'' 
To our good and loyal subjects, 
We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments 
of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our 
Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. 
But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that 
has been done by everyone...the war situation has developed not necessarily 
to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned 
against her interest. 
The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected 
hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings 
of all of you. Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time 
and fate that WE have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the 
generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is 
unsufferable [sic]. 
Having been able to safeguard and maintain the structure of the Imperial 
State, We are always with you. Our good and loyal subjects, relying upon 
your sincerity and integrity. 
Beware most strictly of any outbursts of emotion which may engender 
needless complications, or any fraternal contention and strife which may 
create confusion, lead you astray and cause you to lose the confidence of the 
world. 
Let the entire nation continue as one family from generation to 
generation, ever firm in its faith in the imperishability of its sacred land, and 
mindful of its heavy burden of responsibility and of the long road before it. 
Unite your total strength, to be devoted to construction for the future. 
Cultivate the ways of rectitude, foster nobility of spirit, and work with 
resolution—so that you may enhance the innate glory of the Imperial State 
53 Japanese Imperial Rescript, August 15, 1945, G-2 Historical Section, GHQ, FEC. 
S'* Robert Harvey, American Shogun- GeneralMacArthur, Emperor Hirohito and the 
Drama of Modern Japan, New York, The Overlook Press, 2006, p.292. 
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and keep pace with the progress of the world.^^ 
Hirohito called for calmness, self-discipHne, and assistance to the families of 
soldiers as well as others who suffered as a result of the war.^^ Despite the shock and 
despair that accompanied learning of the nation's defeat, Japanese people accepted the 
fact without riots or disorder, and obeyed the directives of the Emperor to obey the 
new ruler. 
As the trust in MacArthur and his troops deepened, Japanese people began to 
admire them as saviors. They said the GHQ liberated them from death, and the 
occupation was a relief from despair and exhaustion. The food shipments from the 
Americans were, for them, like "merciful rain during a drought."^' Many of Japanese 
nationals wrote letters to MacArthur at the GHQ to express their feelings of gratitude 
CO 
and respect. Prime ministers showed their gratitudes on every anniversary of the 
day the war ended. The Liberal Party made a statement on August 15, 1946 
expressing the appreciation toward the Allied powers "for their generous relief 
measures extended in the present food crisis."^® Thus, Japanese people became to 
think that the Supreme Commander was admirable, and so was democracy. 
MacArthur Fever MacArthur received respect from the Japanese people like 
that accorded to the Emperor. Because the Emperor had been considered divine, the 
citizens were not even allowed to look at him. They had never heard him speak until 
they heard the surrender announcement over the radio on August 15. On the other 
hand, people could actually see MacArthur and listen to him speak on a regular basis. 
55 ImperialBesciipt on Surrender, August 15, 1945. 
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He was for real. In fact, during the occupation period, MacArthur was the most 
popular man in Japan. His strong image and absolute authority appealed to a Japanese 
people in despair. They wanted a new, strong leader to rely on and to follow. People 
even joked that if a man was dominated by a strong-minded wife, his neighbor would 
say "Too bad, she's a MacArthur."^^ MacArthur attracted Japanese people with his 
"electrifying presence." To the Japanese, he was handsome, tall, bold, confident, 
and he had personal aura and charisma. Some of Christian Japanese, after Hirohito 
renounced his divinity, looked to MacArthur as the "second Jesus Christ." There were 
even rumors that he had royal blood, that he was descended from Japanese ancestors, 
and that he had a Nisei daughter. Some East Asian specialists were afraid his 
monocracy might undermine the concept of democratization and self-rule, but others 
believed that the General's "imperious aloofness and lordly graciousness" established 
the prestige of the occupation.^^ In truth, his personal characteristics fit perfectly with 
what the Japanese wanted in a leader. 
Letters to the GHQ One measure of the success of the occupation was the flood 
of letters and gifts the Japanese people sent the General and his staff of the GHQ to 
show their gratitude. About 500,000 letters were counted in the seven years of the 
occupation period. A section called Allied Translator and Interpreter Service (ATIS) 
took charge of translating letters written in Japanese, and they analyzed, and classified 
them. The cover of the ATIS file stated that: 
The advent of the Allied Occupation of Japan in August 1945 offered the 
Japanese people the new freedom of thought and expression of opinion 
without fear of governmental retaliation. This new freedom was manifested 
in vast volumes of letters from the people to SCAP. The analysis contains an 
60 Manchester, p.556. 
61 Sodei, p.5. 
62 Manchester, p.556. 
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accurate insight on current political, economic and sociological opinions of 
the Japanese people.^^ 
The ATIS forwarded letters directly to Mac Arthur and, according to 
occupation veterans who served in the ATIS, MacArthur read every letter that was 
addressed to him personally, and every writer who enclosed the address received a 
, 64 reply. 
Most of the letters showed their support for the policies of the occupation and 
gratitude for benevolent work of the occupation forces in Japan. Some complained 
that the police were too weak, corrupt and discourteous and asked for improvement. 
Others asked for the early conclusion of a peace treaty, arguing that if the Allies 
stayed too long, Japan would become too dependent on the United States. But at the 
same time, there were those who were afraid of losing MacArthur's guidance. One 
writer, fearing the expansion of communism, requested that the Occupation Forces 
remain in Japan after the signing of the peace treaty until Japan became able to take 
care of itself. Many requested permission to emigrate to the United States "the land of 
freedom and individual rights." Surprisingly, some even asked the General to annex 
Japan or turn it into a permanent colony of the United States.^^ 
In addition to letters, people sent numerous gifts to the GHQ. The Americans 
were surprised by the Japanese traditional practice of gift giving. In spite of losing 
their possessions during the war, there was no end to the number of people sending 
gifts of thanks to MacArthur and his staffs. They received kimonos, sashes, dolls, 
bonsai, armor, and swords. At harvest times, vegetables, fruits, flowers, and rice were 
sent from all over Japan.^^ 
63 MacArthur Papers, ATIS-Letters to SCAP, RG-5, Reel #116. 
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MacArthur recognized that he gained understanding and support by the 
Japanese by receiving this flood of gifts and letters of appreciation from them. That 
practice by Japanese nationals satisfied him proving that the occupation was 
proceeding smoothly and satisfactorily for both the Allies and the Japanese. He 
concluded that the first period of the occupation went so smoothly because of the 
good cooperation of both the population and the officials of Japan. The Japanese 
reaction to the initial occupation was so favorable that MacArthur issued an official 
report in September 1945 in which he estimated the total occupation force could be 
cut to 200,000 men by July 1, 1946. The ATIS file also analyzed their 
accomplishment from the letters and concluded with satisfaction that: 
The press has been unshackled, the man on the street is not afraid to 
speak his mind, the government is breaking away from the old traditions, a 
new philosophy of education is developing, political status of Japanese 
subjects has been broadened, and the principles of democracy are beginning 
to make themselves felt throughout the land.^^ 
Oppressed by the authorities, nobody in Japan had expressed their opinion 
towards policy makers by writing letters directly before the end of the war. By writing 
to MacArtur to convey their thoughts or gratitude, they began practicing the principles 
of democracy. 
In sum, treated by the occupation troops with an unexpected generosity, the 
Japanese responded and cooperated with them submissively. Because of MacArthur 
and his advisers' wisdom in taking Japanese public opinion and psychology into 
account when they made decisions, Japanese nationals found them favorable and 
reliable. The Japanese obeyed the occupation authorities without causing major 
opposition against them. Thus, the first period of the occupation went smoothly. 
yLacPiiibm:, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.1, Supp.'pAl. 
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4. Preserving the Emperor 
Most of the people of the Allied countries wanted to punish Emperor 
Hirohito as a war criminal. Many people on the Allied side also expected to abolish 
the imperial system itself, arguing that it was too old-fashioned in the modem world 
and that Shintoism, in which people worshiped the emperor as a living God, was the 
cause of their militarism that led them fanatically into the war.®^ Nevertheless, 
MacArthur preserved the system, believing that retaining the emperor, at least during 
the initial stages of the occupation, would be a low-cost, low-risk method of providing 
a vital transition for the Japanese. This judgment must have been a key of 
MacArthur's success in the occupation of Japan. 
MacArthur understood that the Japanese people had always needed a spiritual 
ruler to worship and hold on to. He predicted it would have brought anarchy, chaos, 
and guerrilla warfare if they had abolished the Emperor, especially in time of such 
crisis. MacArthur wanted to avoid that, because it would require a larger contingent of 
occupation forces to maintain order. Actually, Hirohito was of great use to the 
occupation forces. MacArthur wisely concluded that if the Emperor ordered his 
subjects to obey the occupation forces, they would obey. MacArthur preserved the 
Emperor and the government machinery, because he and his staffs judged that 
utilizing the existent authority was the most effective and easiest way to rebuild 
Japan—at least for the first few years. Thus, the occupation plan was predicated upon 
the ability of the Emperor to maintain psychological control over his people and any 
70 potentially rebellious elements. 
Preserving the Emperor and the imperial institution were also of utmost 
importance to the Japanese leadership. The initial reply of the Japanese government to 
69 Dobbins, pp.38-39. 
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26 
the Potsdam Conference, communicated to the Allies through the Swiss, made 
acceptance of surrender conditional on a guarantee of the Emperor's continued rule. 
Specifically, the Japanese government said they were ready to accept the terms 
declared at Potsdam "with the understanding that the said declaration does not 
comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a 
71 Sovereign Ruler." However, they were refused by U.S. Secretary of State James F. 
Byrnes. He responded by noting that the surrender would be unconditional and that 
both the Emperor and the Japanese government would be subject to MacArthur upon 
surrender. 
American Public's Sentiment against Hirohito Contrary to MacArthur's decision, 
77 percent of Americans wanted the Emperor to be severely punished according to an 
73 opinion poll conducted 6 weeks before the Japanese surrender. Because of the 
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor by the Japanese and the ferocity of the war in the 
Pacific, there was strong anti-Japanese sentiment among the American public, and 
most of it was directed at Emperor Hirohito, in whose name Japan fought. The Stars 
and Stripes described him as "a toothy, bandy-legged, thin-chested and bespectacled 
little man who liked coffee, bacon, and eggs for breakfast. He wrote sorry poetry and 
he studied biology with a Western-made microscope, but to 70 million Japanese he 
was Mr. God in person."^"* MacArthur's biographer, William Manchester, also 
described how Emperor Hirohito looked to Western observers: 
Hirohito was a very ordinary man, a short, absentminded, 
forty-four-year-old father of six children who had inherited his father's 
position nineteen years earlier and had been struggling ever since to make a 
lAacPa:\h\xx:, Report of General MacArthur, Vol.11, Part II. p.l\b. 
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success of it. His appearance was anything but imperial. On the streets of 
New York or London he wouldn't have attracted a second glance. He was shy 
and round-shouldered, with a Chaplinesque profile and a weak, receding chin. 
His coordination was so shaky that he always seemed about to tumble over. 
His mustache was straggly, his face covered with moles, his spectacle lenses 
so thick that his eyes looked as though they had been put in by a taxidermist. 
Around the house he wore shabby clothes and scuffed shoes. Often he 
needed a shave: frequently he forgot to fasten his trousers. As a youth he had 
toured Europe, where he had been introduced to jazz, whisky, and golf, all of 
which he still enjoyed. His only known passion, however, was marine 
biology. He had published several scholarly, if dull, books on marine life, and 
he loved to disappear into his modest home laboratory for an afternoon with 
his microscope and his slides. He probably preferred fish to people.^^ 
These were the general impressions of the Japanese Emperor in the Allied 
countries. The former ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, believed that there was no 
way the Emperor could avoid responsibility for having signed the declaration of war. 
Within the U.S. government, the postwar status of the Emperor and the imperial 
1f t  
institution were the focus of particularly intense debates before Japan's surrender. 
Reading the Psychology of the Japanese MacArthur did not need advisers 
around him to make decisions, but Brigadier General Bonner F. Fellers was 
exceptional. Fellers was MacArthur's military secretary and chief of 
psychological-warfare operations. He advised MacArthur on affairs related to the 
Emperor and Japanese psychology. Fellers had researched "The Psychology of the 
Japanese Soldier" when he was attending the Command and General Staff School at 
Fort Leavenworth as an army captain from 1934 to 1935. Through his study, he 
predicted that the Japanese would adopt the suicidal "kamikaze" tactics once the war 
situation got severe. His report "Answer to Japan," a revised version of his 
psychological study of the Japanese, was used as an orientation guide for the Allied 
•^5 Manchester, p.532. 
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intelligence personnel/^ He concluded the report that: 
Years of blood baths may possibly be avoided if we understand clearly 
our enemy and handle him intelligently. After Japan is totally defeated, 
American justice must be the way and light. An independent Japanese army 
responsible only to the Emperor is a permanent menace to peace. But the 
mystic hold the Emperor has on his people and the spiritual strength of the 
Shinto faith properly directed need not be dangerous. The Emperor can be 
made a force for good and peace provided Japan is totally defeated and the 
military clique destroyed. The Government must have a system of checks and 
balances. The Emperor must be surrounded by liberal civilian leaders. The 
military must be limited to an internal police force, responsible to civil 
authority... Once the Tokyo gangster militarists are dead, once the armed 
forces are destroyed and a liberal government formed under the Emperor, the 
Japanese people—sadder, fewer, and wiser—can begin the reorientation of 
their lives.^^ 
Fellers sent a second memorandum directly to MacArthur on October 2, 1945. 
The emperor worship of the Japanese people was totally foreign and hard to 
understand for people from any Christian country, and that included MacArthur. 
Fellers studied the sentiment of the Japanese public toward the Emperor in depth, and 
tried to convince MacArthur to keep the Emperor. 
Memorandum To The Commander-in-Chief: 
The attitude of the Japanese toward their Emperor is not generally 
understood. Unlike Christians, the Japanese have no God with whom to 
commune. Their Emperor is the living symbol of the race in whom lies the 
virtues of their ancestors. He is the incarnation of national spirit, incapable of 
wrong or misdeeds. Loyalty to him is absolute. Although no one fears him, 
all hold their Emperor in reverential awe. They would not touch him, look 
into his face, address him, step on his shadow. Their abject homage to him 
amounts to a self abnegation sustained by a religious patriotism the depth of 
which is incomprehensible to Westerners. 
To try him as a war criminal would not only be blasphemous but a denial 
of spiritual freedom. 
Dower, p.280. 
•^8 Bonner Fellers, Answer to Japan, Bonner F. Fellers papers, Hoover Institution of 
War and Peace, Stanford University, box 1. pp.22-23. in Dower, pp.280-286. 
29 
The Imperial War Rescript, 8 December 1941, was the inescapable 
responsibility of the Emperor who, as the head of a then sovereign state, 
possessed the legal right to issue it. From the highest and most reliable 
sources, it can be established that the war did not stem from the Emperor 
himself. He has personally said that he had no intention to have the War 
Rescript used as Tojo used it. 
The masses are especially devoted to Hirohito. They feel that his 
addressing the people personally make him unprecedentally close to them. 
His rescript demanding peace filled them with joy. 
By his order seven million soldiers laid down their arms and are being 
rapidly demobilized. Through his act hundreds of thousands of American 
casualties were avoided and the war terminated far ahead of schedule. 
Therefore having made good use of the Emperor, to try him for war crimes, 
to the Japanese, would amount to a breech of faith. Moreover, the Japanese 
feel that unconditional surrender as outlined in the Potsdam Declaration 
meant preservation of the State structure, which includes the Emperor. 
If the Emperor were tried for war crimes the governmental structure 
would collapse and a general uprising would be inevitable. The people will 
uncomplainingly stand any other humiliation. Although they are disarmed, 
there would be chaos and bloodshed. 
American long range interests require friendly relations with the Orient 
based on mutual respect, faith and understanding. In the long run it is of 
7Q 
paramount, national importance that Japan harbor no lasting resentment. 
Thus, despite the general hatred against Hirohito, MacArthur stuck to his 
and Fellers' belief and enforced his policy of retaining the Emperor as a symbolic 
head of the state. 
Criticism against MacArtliur's "Soft Policy" MacArthur's decision was 
criticized by Americans and other Allied countries, which said his occupation policy 
was too soft. As noted, MacArthur's goal was not to provoke the enemy by attacking 
the Emperor. However, to most Westerners, Christians in particular, the notion of 
emperor worship was incomprehensible. To speak of the emperor as the Son of 
•^9 MacArthur Papers, Memorandum to the Commander in Chief from Bonner F. 
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Heaven, as he was commonly termed in English, seemed close to equating him with 
Christ, the Son of God. American observers did not want to accept this notion and 
devoted a great deal of attention to this issue. To counter such views and gain support 
for his occupation policy, MacArthur had to make sure that the Japanese officials 
would separate Shintoism and the state stricdy, and launch a campaign to change the 
Emperor's public image. 
The General also worked hard to change the public image of the Emperor 
into a democrat and peacemaker who had been duped by the militarist leaders into 
waging a war he had not desired. MacArthur always mentioned his gratitude toward 
Hirohito for cooperating with the occupation forces at every occasion. MacArthur 
maintained that "the smooth occupation was really due to the Emperor's leadership." 
80 His appreciation for Hirohito was widely reported in the Western press. In an 
interview with the president of the United Press on September 21, 1945, MacArthur 
said "this bloodless occupation would have been impossible without the retention of 
the Emperor for surrender purposes and declared the maintenance of the Emperor 
o 1 
during disarmament resulted in "untold saving of American lives, money and time." 
Becoming a Human Although the Emperor remained on the throne, MacArthur 
assumed the sovereign authority to rule the state, in accordance with the Potsdam 
Declaration. Then, on the first New Year's Day after the war ended, Hirohito issued a 
statement, known as "declaration of humanity," renouncing his divinity. It was the 
first formal address to his subjects since August 15, the day of surrender. Revising his 
constitutional status drastically and becoming a human, Hirohito managed to satisfy 
many of his foreign critics that he no longer claimed divinity. Following that 
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announcement, he began touring the country. He visited almost every prefecture in 
order to boost morale and support the objectives of the occupation. Dressed in a 
Western suit, the Emperor walked toward and talked to the people for the first time in 
Japanese history. He was no longer a living God, he had become a human. This 
dramatic change had a great impact not only on the Japanese but also on foreigners, 
proving that the status of the emperor had really changed. 
Emperor and the War The Allies never seriously investigated the 
responsibility of the Emperor for the war. However, Reports of General MacArthur 
filed an unpublished manuscript by Marquis Yasumasa Matsudaira, The Japanese 
Emperor and The War, in which he emphasized Hirohito's pacifism and lack of 
responsibility for the war. It was written in December 1949 in response to a request 
from the G-2 Historical Section of the GHQ. The GHQ intended to encourage better 
understanding about the Japanese emperor among Westerners by crediting the 
important role played by Hirohito in the termination of the Pacific War and his 
influence in bringing hostilities to an end. 
Matsudaira was one of the Emperor's trusted advisors and wrote that the 
Emperor was a pacifist, that he tried to prevent the war but could do nothing, and that 
he tried to end the war as soon as possible for the sake of his nation and mankind. 
Matsudaira also revealed that there was a wide divergence of views between the 
Cabinet and the military. Military leaders, led by War Minister Hideki Tojo, were firm 
believers in "total war," which would be fought not by soldiers alone but by gearing 
09 
up the national economy, politics, and public opinion. Oppressed by the military 
leaders who were eager to go to war for the nation's imperialistic expansion, he said, 
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civilian officials in the Cabinet were too weak and powerless to oppose them; the 
Imperial conference of December 1, 1941 attended by all ministers of state as well as 
the Chiefs of the Army and Navy commands unanimously decided on war. 
Matsudaira described the first part (1926-1936) of the Showa Era, the period 
when Hirohito was in throne, as representing a great change in Japanese thought and 
in the economy. The economic depression after the World War I heavily impacted the 
lives of Japanese people and engendered extremist movements both to the right and to 
the left. It was, Matsudaira analyzed, an era of political instability when the military 
clique raised its head and Japanese foreign policy took on a markedly aggressive 
character. 
Matsudaira also noted that the position of the emperor in the Japanese 
governmental scheme had no right to deny the decisions made in the Cabinet; all he 
could do was to sign the final form and take all responsibility for the outcome. "The 
King reigns but does not rule." This English proverb, Matsudaira wrote, was literally 
translated into action by Hirohito.^'* From Meiji Era, it had been an unwritten law that 
the Emperor would approve any decision of the Government, never would he veto it. 
Despite the experience of Japanese expansionism, Matsudaira saw this practice as the 
most appropriate means of safeguarding monarchy from falling into dictatorship and 
fitting it into the system of a constitutional government. The principle under the old 
constitution that the Emperor shall always rely on the advice and assistance of his 
ministers in all matters of state, had established a rule that the Emperor was not to 
85 exercise the veto as an Imperial prerogative. 
Considering these conditions, Matsudaira expanded on two major reasons 
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why Hirohito could not prevent the war. First, the mihtary—especially the Army—was 
extremely high-handed and intractable, and ignored the wishes of the Emperor. 
Second, the Government and the Diet, and public opinion itself were all powerless 
before the military because of their aggressiveness toward the war and the public 
education encouraging to back their points of view.^^ Japan was a deeply militarized 
society, and the discipline of small boys was Spartan, with the object of turning them 
into tough soldiers. The Emperor's role was to sign the final form and be 
responsible for the decision: an unwritten law made the Emperor approve any 
decision of the Government, he would never veto it, even though he was determined 
to prevent the war from the beginning to the end. 
Matsudaira also noted that the Emperor was pessimistic about the course of 
the war, seeing no hope of victory over the highly mechanized Allied forces, at the 
same time he was sympathetic for the war dead and their families. Thus, the Emperor 
thought the war should be stopped, and he favored a diplomatic solution with 
acceptable conditions to end the war before the Soviet Union could join the war in the 
Pacific. Ultimately, things did not go the way the Emperor wanted, and he could not 
announce the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration until his country was attacked by 
two devastating atomic bombs. Finally, Hirohito could approve the surrender, saying 
that "I cannot bear to see my innocent people suffer any longer. Ending the war is the 
only way to restore world peace and to relieve the nation from the terrible distress 
oo 
with which it is burdened." 
GHQ officials asked Matsudaira to prepare this manuscript to add as an 
appendix of Reports of General MacArthur because it served their intention of raising 
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Americans' understanding of MacArthur's decision to retain the Emperor by 
explaining Japan's political circumstances and promoting Hirohito's positive traits 
and behavior. Also, Matsudaira's description of the collapsed Japanese political 
system helped to prove that GHQ needed to transform the Japanese Imperial 
Government into democratic political institution as one of the work of 
democratization. The occupation officials determined to reform the structure of the 
Japanese political system into a democratic one in which checks and balances would 
function and to resituate the Emperor as the center of their new democracy. 
Japanese People's Concerns for the Emperor Most of the Japanese favored and 
appreciated MacArthur's decision not to punish the Emperor. Prime Minister Shigeru 
Yoshida praised MacArthur as the "great benefactor" of Japan, referring to his 
preservation of the throne and protection of the Emperor in a time of unprecedented 
89 events. The Liberal Party of Japan made a statement on the first anniversary of the 
end of the war, expressing their gratitude toward the Allied powers, especially to 
General MacArthur's headquarters, for understanding the Japanese people's need to 
continue the imperial system, as well as for their generous relief measures extended in 
the serious food crises.^'^ 
A majority of the Japanese public in fact favored the preservation of the 
Emperor and the imperial system. Public opinion polls conducted on December 9, 
1945 revealed that 95 percent of the Japanese favored preserving the imperial 
system.®' Reflecting this sentiment, many Japanese people sent letters to GHQ to 
appeal MacArthur for clemency for the emperor and the maintenance of the imperial 
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92 system. The National Archives in Washington D.C. holds collection of some of the 
important documents and correspondence during the occupation. Among them are 164 
letters expressing concerns about the Emperor.A majority of the letters were sent to 
GHQ between November 1945 and January 1946. GHQ received a great many letters 
after Emperor Hirohito visited MacArthur at the American embassy in Tokyo on 
September 27, 1945, asking that the Emperor be saved from punishment as a war 
criminal. The Japanese people were shocked to see the picture of MacArthur and 
Hirohito in newspapers. MacArthur was dressed casually with his hands on his waist; 
the Emperor dressed formally and stood next to General, dwarfed by the larger 
American. For some people, this photo finally triggered a recognition that Japan had 
lost the war. The picture made it obvious that the General was the new ruler and the 
Emperor was the head of the defeated country. Thereafter, the Japanese people had 
some kind of sympathy for the humbled Hirohito, who now had to call on MacArthur. 
To the Japanese, it was inconceivable before that the Emperor would visit someone, 
he had to be visited. Even the tour around the country after his declaration of 
humanity made the nationals feel sympathetic for Hirohito. 
Reflecting this sympathy, most of the Japanese people hoped that Hirohito 
would not be punished at the Tokyo trial. Some of the letters expressed the fact that, 
for the Japanese, Hirohito was a parent, the object of their faith, and if something 
happened to him, the people would lose their purpose of living. They begged in the 
letters, "Please, General MacArthur, I ask you again and again, do not put the emperor 
on trial."^'^ In extreme cases, they wrote petitions with their blood. These letters made 
MacArthur aware of the extreme nationalism that might be unleashed if he punished 
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the Emperor. Mac Arthur had already decided to retain the Emperor before he met 
Hirohito, but, surely, those letters from the Japanese helped him and his staff better 
recognize the people's desire to preserve the Emperor.^^ 
Again, retaining the Emperor was one of the factors that made the occupation 
of Japan successful. MacArthur analyzed the status of the emperor for the people of 
Japan as well as their psychological patterns. And he made a great use of the Emperor. 
MacArthur could govern the Japanese effectively with the support of the Emperor, 
instead of causing the chaos and bloodshed by punishing him. The Japanese people 
obeyed the occupation troops submissively because the Emperor ordered them to do 
so. Thus, the occupation mission went smoothly. MacArthur and his adviser wisely 
predicted it. 
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5. Americans' View of Japan 
Sentiment Against the Japanese To gain the support and understanding from 
Americans toward the occupation mission of democratizing Japan, MacArthur had to 
change the propagandistic view that persisted in American people's mind not only 
about the Emperor but about Japan as a whole. Ever since the surprise attack on Pearl 
Harbor, newspapers had kept reporting the brutal batdes and fanatic fighting style of 
Japanese soldiers such as "kamikaze pilots" and "hara-kiri" by Japanese POWs. The 
American people were told that all Japanese were treacherous, brutal, children, apes, 
sadistic, fanatical, savages, madmen, robots, monkey-men, and the most militaristic 
nationals in the world.^® Since the notion of emperor worship was blasphemous to 
Christians, they perceived the imperial system and Shinto, which encouraged 
militarism and imperial expansion, as superstitions that should be abolished. To speak 
of the emperor as the Son of Heaven (as he was commonly termed in English) they 
thought, seemed perilously close to equating him with Christ and that was 
07 unacceptable for Christians. 
The Victory Edition of The Stars and the Stripes exemplified U.S. views of 
Japan. "Japan, the little nation that removed a smiling, obsequious mask to reveal the 
face of a gorilla," it repeated, "with that beast's strength, instincts and demeanor, lay 
go 
in utter defeat today before the United States and its Allies." It also described Japan 
as a totally alien place, and the "strangest country in the world." 
Japan has a deceptive appearance of being quaint. Actually the 
people are suspicious of one another, gregarious and mass conceited but 
individually humble. They regard everything about their country as holy. 
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As a nation the Japs lack imagination, copying much from other 
countries. Traditional art, literature and architecture were results of steals 
from China, yet now Nipponese culture is a homogeneous blend drawn from 
many foreign civilizations. 
In some ways Japan is the strangest country in the world. White is 
the color of mourning and black the color of ceremony. Newspapers are read 
from right to left and when tea is brewed, masks are worn over the mouth to 
"safeguard the aroma of the tea." 
The Japanese take baths of 140 degrees, hotter than any other people 
can endure, and instead of sleeping in comfortable beds they prefer a straw 
mat on the floor with a hollow porcelain pillow for a head rest. 
Such exaggerated images of Japan were reported continuously by American 
media. Thus, it was necessary for the occupation officials to give American people a 
positive impression of the Japanese to gain support and understanding for the 
occupation mission. The instructional film for GHQ officials, "Our Job in Japan" 
emphasized that the Japanese were a people trained to play "follow-the-leader."^^ 
They were victims of the nation, it said, so the occupation forces had to liberate them 
from their state of slavery. Joseph Grew, ambassador to Japan from 1932 to 1942, 
published a collection of his diaries and official documents in 1944, in the midst of 
the war in the Pacific. He described the great strength and fanatical determination, the 
utter cruelty and brutality of the Japanese military. However, his true aim was to ease 
the tension between the peoples of the two countries for the latter days when they had 
to deal with the postwar reconstruction. He thus informed Americans that there were 
innocent people in Japan who bitterly opposed the war with the United States.'*^ 
While Americans' hatred of the Japanese grew during the brutal war, the 
Japanese people were also taught that their enemies, the Americans and the British in 
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particular, "were devils: hardly human at all, barbaric beyond belief.""" Japan's 
leaders took pains to set Japan apart from others. During the war, the Japanese 
routinely referred to themselves as the leading race of the world.On the day of the 
Pearl Harbor attack, the Japanese government approved a document entitled "An 
outline of Information and Propaganda Policies for the War between Japan and the 
Anglo-American Powers." It stated that "the enemy's selfish desire for world 
conquest made war unavoidable, and Japan's cause was a moral one. The country's 
goal was to create a new world order which would enable all nations and races to 
assume their proper place in the world, and all peoples to be at peace in their own 
sphere."'®^ 
It was one of MacArthur's accomplishments that he helped remove the hatred 
between the peoples of Japan and the U.S. through the work of the occupation. 
MacArthur's willingness to help the enemy country recover was particularly 
remarkable in light of his personal experience of many brutal battles. Putting aside 
any personal feelings, throughout the occupation, MacArthur left a good impression 
of the Americans through the generosity of their troops and his leadership and dignity. 
He also reported the positive reactions from the Japanese toward the occupation to the 
people of the United States. 
MacArthur's Perception of Japan Because of the strong hatred felt toward 
the Japanese after Pearl Harbor, the American public did not support the work of the 
occupation of Japan to the extent they backed the same mission in Germany. Thus, 
MacArthur initially had difficulty getting attention, understanding, and material 
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support for his mission in Japan. He thus had to work to promote the positive image 
of the Japanese and show the progress he had made in Japan. In a radio address to the 
people of the United States after the surrender ceremony on September 2, 1945, 
MacArthur expressed the belief that the people of Japan needed to be liberated: 
We stand in Tokyo today reminiscent of our countryman, 
Commodore Perry, ninety-two years ago. His purpose was to bring to Japan 
an era of enlightenment and progress by lifting the veil of isolation to the 
friendship, trade and commerce of the world. But, alas, the knowledge 
thereby gained of Western science was forged into an instrument of 
oppression and human enslavement. Freedom of expression, freedom of 
action, even freedom of thought were denied through supervision of liberal 
education, through appeal to superstition and through the application of force. 
We are committed by the Potsdam Declaration of Principles to see that the 
Japanese people are liberated from this condition of slavery. It is my purpose 
to implement this commitment just as rapidly as the armed forces are 
demobilized and other essential steps taken to neutralize the war potential. 
The energy of the Japanese race, if properly directed, will enable expansion 
vertically rather than horizontally. If the talents of the race are turned into 
constructive channels, the country can lift itself from its present deplorable 
state into a position of dignity... 
He also explained that "during the progress of the war, these seventy million 
heard of nothing but Japanese victories and the bestial qualities of Japan's opponents. 
When they suddenly felt the concentrated shock of total defeat, their whole world 
crumbled. It was not merely an overthrow of their military might—not merely a great 
defeat for their nation—^he explained; it was the collapse of a faith, the disintegration 
of everything they had believed in and lived by and thought for. It left a complete 
vacuum morally, mentally and physically."'"^ 
Unlike his public statements, however, MacArthur seemed, in his own mind. 
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to harbor images of Japanese as belUgerent and natural warriors. His 
psychological-warfare adviser. Fellers, researched Japanese behavior patterns and 
identified "a fifteen-point mantra": inferiority complex, credulousness, regimented 
thought, tendency to misrepresent, self-dramatization, strong sense of responsibility, 
super-aggressiveness, brutality, inflexibility, tradition of self-destruction, superstition, 
face-saving tendency, intense emotionality, attachment to home and family, and 
Emperor worship.'"^ Even after the return to the United States in April 1951, 
Mac Arthur publicly described the Japanese as "a boy of twelve"'®^ compared to 45 
years-old Germans. In his view, Japan resembled the feudalistic European nations of 
four centuries earlier, and in some aspects of their way of living was more 
old-fashioned than that. To him, the people's worship of the emperor as God and 
absolute sovereign was more like ancient Sparta than a modem nation. 
In his later reminiscences he reiterated his original perception of Japan but 
admitted it was a false conception. 
Supposedly, the Japanese were a twentieth-century civilization. In 
reality, they were more nearly a feudal society, of the type discarded by 
Western nations some four centuries ago. There were aspects of Japanese life 
that went farther back than that. Although theocracy was a system of 
government that had been thoroughly discredited by 3,000 years of progress 
in the Western world, it still existed in Japan. The Emperor was considered a 
divine being, and the average Japanese subject dared not even lift up his eyes 
to view his ruler. This God-Emperor was absolute. His word was final... 
There was no such thing as civil rights. There were not even human rights. 
The property and produce of the average Japanese individual could be taken 
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away from him in whole or in part as it suited the ruling cliques. Between 
1937 and 1940 more than 60,000 people were thrown into prison for 
"dangerous thinking" by the secret police. Indeed, an American viewing 
Japan would be inclined to class it as more nearly akin to ancient Sparta than 
to any modern nation. 
For almost four years the Japanese people had expected nothing but 
victory. Every bulletin blared of success. Not only that; the people had been 
told they were fighting a kind of holy crusade against barbarians who had no 
respect for anything. The war must be won to prevent rape, murder, and other 
unspeakable crimes. As a leader of the American forces, the Japanese 
government concentrated on me. When American troops landed in Japan in 
August 1945, the image of the sadistic commander and his rapacious soldiery 
was in every Japanese hiiod. 
From the very beginning I tried to erase this false conception. In my 
speech aboard the Missouri I had very carefully tried to reassure the Japanese 
people, and a few days later, when I moved my headquarters into the Dai Ichi 
Building, I made a public statement that "SCAP is not concerned with how to 
keep Japan down, but how to get her on her feet again." I underlined again 
and again that we had several missions. It was true that we intended to 
destroy Japan as a militarist power. It was true that we intended to impose 
penalties for past wforigis. These things had been set out in the surrender 
terms. But we also felt lhat we could best accomplish our purpose by 
building a new kind of Japan, one that would give the Japanese people 
freedom and justice, and some kind of security. I was determined that our 
principles during the occupation would be the same principles for which our 
soldiers had fought on the battlefield.'"^ 
Democratizing From Within One of the Japanese systems that looked so 
feudalistic to MacArthur was the family structure in Japan. GHQ officials studied the 
system from a report sent to Bonner Fellers by a former professor of Tokyo Imperial 
University who was discharged for liberal tendencies."' This professor explained the 
old-fashioned Japanese family system and requested that the General democratize the 
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family. The writer argued that the essence of the Japanese family was the succession 
of family-chiefs like the ancient dynasties. Children were not allowed to form their 
own opinions, the position of women was that of half-slaves, and there was no 
financial independence to subordinate males and female members of the family. 
Inequality between husbands and wives was extraordinary. Women had no 
educational, social, or economic equality, not to mention political equality. In this 
writer's view, obedience, not love was the cement of the Japanese family. He insisted 
love and mutual respect needed to be introduced to democratize this small feudal 
society called the family. 
The writer also argued that the strong patriarchal tendency of the Japanese 
family system should be altered to favor women's influence in the family. Women 
were taught in old-fashioned families to endure silently the misconduct of the husband. 
While wife's adultery was always criminal, for example, a husband's was criminal 
only when it was committed with a married woman. Moreover, children had no 
freedom in choosing a marriage partner, and men under the age of 25 and women 
under 30 could not marry without permission of their parents. 
This report must have shocked GHQ officers and other Westerners, because it 
was so different from the Western experience. MacArthur was eager to revise the 
constitution to emancipate Japanese women from their slave status of men. He 
believed that "women, like men, had souls. Therefore, they should be treated equally." 
Thus, he launched that reform right away and, indeed, Japanese women achieved 
suffrage in December 1945, in just 3 months after the occupation started. Marriage 
and divorce statutes were also rewritten, contract marriage and concubinage were 
prohibited, high schools became coeducational, and twenty-six women's universities 
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112 were opened. 
MacArthur's Mission MacArthur perceived his role not as a conqueror but as a 
protector and a guardian of the Japanese people. He understood the Japanese needed 
spiritual leadership as well as material administration, since they suffered from "shell 
shock" and faced the despair of the massive defeat."^ MacArthur said, "never in 
history had a nation and its people been more completely crushed" and "the bitter 
sting and humiliation of defeat had left the people dazed, tottering, and numb with 
shock."'"* 
MacArthur played a role of a strong dictator with his understanding that the 
Japanese were used to being governed by force and authority. MacArthur's biographer, 
William Manchester, revealed that MacArthur later said of Asians that "even after 50 
years of living among these people, I still don't understand them.""^ However, 
publicly, as a commander, he had to show the confidence that he completely 
understood the Japanese. It was true that he spent many years before in the 
Philippines and he understood the Filipinos. However, Japan was initially exotic and 
very foreign country for him. So, MacArthur had studied Japanese folklore, politics, 
and economy. Most of all he had researched how Hirohito's people lived, worked, and 
thought. He was astute and quick to leam things, and he could sense what he should 
do and what the Japanese people needed. One of his closest advisers, General 
Courtney Whitney, revealed that despite the commander's own misgivings, 
"MacArthur knew the Orient, the basic Japanese character, and their national spirit of 
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traditional chivalry called Bushido."^^^ And in hindsight MacArthur said he was 
"thoroughly familiar with Japanese administration, its weaknesses and its strengths," 
and that the reforms he contemplated were those that would bring Japan abreast of 
117 modem progressive thought and action. Thus, he did not need much advice from 
his staff. Reflecting his understanding of Japanese hierarchy, he never allowed 
Japanese officials to meet him except for the Emperor Hirohito and a few prime 
ministers and high-ranking cabinet members. In that way, he tried to keep a certain 
distance from the Japanese and behaved like a charismatic and unapproachable ruler, 
as if he had assumed the emperor's throne. 
From the moment of his appointment as supreme commander, MacArthur 
recognized his mission was to become an economist, a political scientist, an engineer, 
a manufacturing executive, a teacher, even a theologian of sorts, in order to rebuild a 
nation that had been almost completely destroyed by the war.' His perception of his 
duty and his demeanor as a charismatic leader with absolute authority proved 
effective in ruling the Japanese citizens. 
MacArthur also worked hard to let American people know the importance of 
the survival of Japan and stability of this region for the national interests of the United 
States. He understood Japanese people's tremendous energy and vast potential and 
that the fate of this country would matter to Americans in the future. He knew that, 
although most people thought of Japan as small, it was considerably larger than Italy 
and half the size of the United Kingdom, with roughly twice the population of each of 
the four big countries in Western Europe—West Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, 
and France."^ He argued that Japan was "the bulwark of freedom, the springboard of 
116 MacArthxir, Reminiscences, p.270. 
117 Ibid., p.282. 
118 Ibid., Reminiscences, pp.281-282. 
119 Manchester, p.537. 
46 
the future, and Americans had not begun to reaUze its vast potentialities."'^" After he 
returned to the United States in 1951, he gave speeches all across the States and 
enthusiastically told people the significance of maintaining peace and stability in the 
Asia Pacific region. His address before the House of Representatives on April 19, 
1951 at which he reported his accomplishments in Japan and the situation in the Far 
East, was typical. He insisted that Americans had to understand the importance of this 
region for the United States, and that they must understand about the Asian people, 
their background, and the conditions under which they were suffering, rather than just 
hating them and clinging to past negative impressions: 
While Asia is commonly referred to as the gateway to Europe, it is no 
less true that Europe is the gateway to Asia, and the broad influence of the 
one cannot fail to have its impact upon the other... 
Mustering half of the earth's population and 60 percent of its natural 
resources, these peoples are rapidly consolidating a new force, both moral 
and material, with which to raise the living standard and erect adaptations of 
the design of modem progress to their own distinct cultural environments. 
Whether one adheres to the concept of colonization or not, this is the 
direction of Asian progress and it may not be stopped. It is a corollary to the 
shift of the world economic frontiers, as the whole epicenter of world affairs 
rotates back toward the area whence it started... What they seek now is 
friendly guidance, understanding, and support, not imperious direction; the 
dignity of equality, not the shame of subjugation. Their prewar standards of 
life, pitifully low, is infinitely lower now in the devastation left in war's wake. 
World ideologies play little part in Asian thinking and are little understood. 
What the peoples strive for is the opportunity for a little more food in their 
stomachs, a little better clothing on their backs, a little firmer roof over their 
heads, and the realization of the normal nationalist urge for political freedom. 
The Pacific was a potential area of advance for any predatory force 
intent upon striking at the bordering land areas. All this was changed by our 
Pacific victory. Our strategic frontier then shifted to embrace the entire 
Pacific Ocean which became a vast moat to protect us as long as we hold it. 
Indeed, it acts as a protective shield for all of the Americas and all free lands 
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of the Pacific Ocean area. We control it to the shores of Asia by a chain of 
islands extending in an arc from the Aleutians to the Marianas held by us and 
191 our free allies. 
MacArthur made every decision without Japanese officials' involvement and 
he believed in his judgment, despite the general opinion of the American public. He 
played a role of strong dictator and enforced his policy, and that approved worked out 
well with the Japanese. Whether it was his natural personality or his intention, his 
strong attitude as a commander suited well his duty of Supreme Commander of the 
occupation of Japan. MacArthur often intimated that his only guides were George 
Washington, Abraham Lincoln and Jesus Christ, and he seemed to operate on the 
assumption that the four of them together could—with help from the 
emperor—democratize Japan.As Washington and Lincoln had fought wars and 
saved the nation, MacArthur attempted to save Japan with his charismatic leadership 
and absolute authority, even though it was not his own country. As Jesus Christ guides 
people spiritually, MacArthur tried to be a leader to guide a former enemy, the 
Japanese, and support them in their recovery from material and spiritual defeat. 
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6. Why the U.S. Helped Japan: Messianic Zeal for Civilizing Japan 
After demobilization, democratizing Japan was the second most important 
mission of the occupation. In the Potsdam Declaration, the Allies stated that they did 
not intend to destroy or just punish the Japanese by force. Instead, their aim was to 
democratize feudalistic Japan and liberate its people from their old fashioned social 
system, and to help them rebuild their devastated country. The Potsdam Declaration 
stated: 
We do not intend that the Japanese shall be enslaved as a race or 
destroyed as a nation, but stem justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, 
including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners. The Japanese 
Government shall remove all obstacles to the revival and strengthening of 
democratic tendencies among the Japanese people. Freedom of speech, of 
religion and of thought, as well as respect for the fundamental human rights, 
shall be established.'^^ 
After GHQ completed the demobilization, they could have left Japan without 
helping their reconstruction. Yet they stayed and continued humanitarian activities. 
United States officials, especially MacArthur, must have had a messianic zeal for the 
occupation of Japan. In addition to demobilizing Japanese forces and building up the 
U.S. military presence in the Pacific through the occupation, MacArthur devoted 
himself to liberate the Japanese from the imperialistic state by injecting American 
values of democracy and Christianity. He was committed to emancipating women 
from inequality, to liberalizing and modernizing the social system, and to 
democratizing education. 
In truth, MacArthur perceived the democratic reform of Japan as a God-given 
mission.It was the white men's duty to civilize the Oriental. Just like his father, 
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who saved the FiHpinos from the Spanish invasion in 1898, MacArthur was also a 
hero in the Philippines, where some of the most brutal atrocities by the Japanese took 
place during the World War II. The Philippines was a U.S. Commonwealth from 1935 
to 1946. MacArthur supervised the Filipinos' creation of a Philippine Army. As the 
gratitude for that contribution, Filipino President, Manuel Quezon granted Douglas 
MacArthur the rank of Field Marshal of the Philippines in 1937, the highest rank ever 
conveyed to an American. 
The American movement of expanding the frontier on the American 
continent and imperialistic expansion overseas in the late nineteenth century stemmed 
from a belief in Manifest Destiny—a belief that the United States has a God-given 
mission to expand to spread democracy and freedom in the world. MacArthur's 
mission of saving East Asian civilians and promoting American democracy in the 
Pacific had a similarity to that belief. He wrote later that his democratization mission 
of Japan was an experiment. "Japan had become the world's great laboratory for an 
experiment in the liberation of a people from totalitarian military rule and for the 
liberalization of government from within. It was clear that the experiment in Japan 
must go far beyond the primary purpose of the Allies—the destruction of Japan's 
125 ability to wage another war and the punishment of war criminals." 
However, it was contradictory that while MacArthur was calling for freedom 
of belief, he forced the Japanese to reform their system with the American value of 
democracy from above. While he was encouraging his troops to leam some aspects 
from Japanese culture, they believed Western culture and its values were superior to 
those of the Orient and forced the Japanese to adopt them. 
For example, GHQ officials seriously considered abolishing the use of 
125 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p.282. 
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"kanji," Chinese characters that the Japanese used as one of their alphabets, and 
allowing only "katakana," another alphabet which is simpler than kanji, in order to 
make it easier for GHQ officials to screen and investigate documents written in 
Japanese. They were in urgent need of personnel who could read Japanese writing to 
monitor their publications and documents, but training Americans in kanji was 
extremely difficult and time consuming. They found that katakana would be simpler 
and easier to leam in a short term. Some even called for abolishing all the Japanese 
alphabets and replacing them with anglicized "romaji." The supporters of this plan 
argued that teaching kanji to Japanese children was wasting time that could be spent 
on learning other things. American intellectuals who opposed this idea argued that it 
would ruin Japan's cultural and intellectual heritage and might also cause serious 
social chaos. Eventually, one idea of changing Japanese writing system was dismissed 
because MacArthur wanted to avoid changing something so close to their daily lives 
so drastically.'^^ 
Thus, the fate of Japan was in MacArthur's hands, from small reforms such 
as writing system to comprehensive ones like drafting a new constitution. Japanese 
citizens were no longer subjects of the Emperor, but they still remained subjects of the 
occupation. It was inevitable that there be inequality between the victors and the 
vanquished. However, the occupation reflected Americans' belief in their superiority 
to the Japanese, and white supremacy to the Asian. MacArthur himself said that "Asia 
was culturally and politically backward, and that the Oriental mind had been 
socialized to obey authority,"and took for granted that the nations of the Far East 
still had to be led into this new era by such authority figures as himself. Ultimately, as 
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noted, MacArthur was right about reading the patterns of Japanese people's behavior 
and his tactics of being a dictator worked effectively in handling the Japanese 
nationals. 
Christianization as a Way of Democratization One thing that MacAxthur 
attempted but could not accomplish was the Christian conversion of the Japanese. A 
devout Christian himself, MacArthur strongly believed that making the Japanese 
believe in Christianity would keep them from despair. Through the mission of 
separating Shinto strictly from politics and education, he enthusiastically brought over 
2,500 Christian missionaries from the United States to Japan during the occupation 
128 period, and provided them with military planes, trains, and residences. MacArthur 
said "The more missionaries we can bring out here, and the more occupation troops 
129 we can send home, the better." He also requested that the Pocket Testament League 
distribute 10,000,000 Bibles translated into Japanese. MacArthur believed that 
Christian ideal must be instilled to change the belligerent, nationalistic Japanese spirit 
that stemmed from Shinto. MacArthur thought that one mission of the occupation was 
to build "Christian highways" in Japan. He believed that every member of the 
occupation force was a missionary, and they were communicating a noble influence to 
the Japanese mind. 
MacArthur further believed in the close connection between Christianity and 
democracy and insisted that believing in Christianity would help the Japanese accept 
the value of democracy. "We need to emphasize with clarity the essential usefulness 
of Christianity in human progress," he argued, "democracy and Christianity have 
much in common, as practice of the former is impossible without giving faithful 
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service to the fundamental concepts underlying the latter."'^^ Thus, he welcomed the 
election in may 1947 of a new Prime Minister, Tetsu Katayama, who happened to be a 
Christian. MacArthur stated that "of possibly even greater significance than the 
political implications of Mr. Katayama's emergence as Prime Minister of Japan are its 
spiritual implications. For the first time in history, Japan is led by a Christian 
leader—one who throughout his life has been a member of the Presbyterian Church. It 
reflects the complete religious tolerance which now dominates the Japanese mind and 
131 the complete religious freedom which exists throughout this land." MacArthur 
found it significant for the international community of the Asia-Pacific region that 
Christians led the three important nations in the region: Chiang Kai-shek of China, 
Manuel Roxas of the Philippines, and Tetsu Katayama of Japan.MacArthur must 
have felt hopeful of establishing a coalition through Christian values with all these 
Christian leaders, believing that expanding democracy combined with Christianity 
would bring peace in the Pacific when they were facing communist influences in the 
region. 
Further, MacArthur found it encouraging when Tokyo Imperial University 
elected a Christian, Shigeru Nanbara, for the president in December, 1945. TIU was 
the top national university of Japan and was very influential in Japanese society. 
MacArthur might have thought he could Christianize the whole country with the 
influence of the university and support by Nanbara. However, when Nanbara's effort 
to start teaching a course of Christianity at his university ended in vain because of the 
budget problem, MacArthur and his Christian colleagues came up with an idea to 
establish a new Christian university instead on their own. The former ambassador to 
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Japan, Joseph Grew became the president of the committee to found International 
Christian University. The creation of ICU reflected a belief that only Christianity 
could save the Japanese from the old spirit of militaristic feudalism, and it would lead 
133 to a bright democracy instead of communism. MacArthur supported their fund 
raising as an honorary chairman. International Christian University was established in 
Mitaka, Tokyo in 1953. 
Christianity was to be the core pillar of most of MacArthur's occupation 
policies. In his personal correspondence to Dr. Roy G. Ross, MacArthur wrote "The 
principles underlying the Christian faith furnished the moral force for the defeat of the 
Japanese empire and provided the philosophy for the treatment of the fallen foe... 
Christian faith has formed the sturdy cornerstones upon which has rested our national 
strength... Thereafter, it became those same high principles of human 
relationship—tolerance and justice, the basic dogma of our Christian faith—that formed 
the very key arch to the philosophy underlying all policy governing the treatment of 
our vanquished foe in the occupation of Japan."^^"* 
Accordingly, MacArthur seemed to want to convert all the Japanese into 
Christians. Yet despite MacArthur's efforts and those of other enthusiastic Christian 
movements, Japan did not become a Christian country. The number of Christians in 
Japan before the war was believed to be around 200,000. After the occupation, the 
number only grew to be 250,000, out of all the population of 80,000,000.^^^ This was 
one of a few things MacArthur did not accomplish. 
It is worth arguing whether MacArthur's policy of promoting Christianity 
conflicted with his policy of freedom of religion. As noted, while GHQ strictly 
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separated Shinto from Japanese politics and education, they encouraged the Japanese 
people to believe in Christianity. Christian Japanese praised MacArthur as the second 
Jesus Christ, however, some intellectuals began to point out this contradiction. 
MacArthur legitimized his policy by arguing that the occupation troops had the right 
to promote Christianity as far as no other specific religions were suppressed. 
MacArthur, with a tendency to be blind about things he did not do well, insisted the 
estimate of the number of Christian Japanese after the occupation as 2,000,000, 
adding an extra zero to the real number. 
Differences from the German Occupation T.V Soong, a Chinese politician, 
pointed out that "It's ironical, but the victor has to help get the vanquished back on his 
feet."'^^ That applies to the case of World War II. The Allies occupied Germany, as 
well. They launched the occupation in Germany after Hitler committed suicide and 
Germany surrendered unconditionally on May 7, 1945. The world needed both 
countries to be rebuilt, because Japan was the hub of East Asian industry and 
commerce (China wanted to restart trading with Japan), and Germany had been the 
hub of continental European industry and commerce and had supplied coal to 
European nations. Now they had both collapsed. The primary aims of the occupation 
of Germany were initially the same as that of Japan—disarmament and punishment of 
war criminals, and both then changed to emphasize rebuilding. However, the 
conditions of the occupation of two countries were fundamentally different from each 
other. 
First, and most important, while the United States operated Japan's 
occupation unilaterally, the occupation of Germany was operated multilaterally by the 
136 Sodei (1976), p.257. 
13'' MacArthur Papers, RG"5, Reel#25, T.V Soong, NichiBei Times 
55 
Allied four powers—the United States, England, France, and the Soviet Union, which 
divided the country into four zones and administered them separately. The capital of 
West Germany, Berlin, was occupied jointly, with each power administering a sector 
of the city, and was governed by an inner-Allied authority. There were also agencies 
that coordinated the occupation by four powers—the Council of Foreign Ministers and 
the Control Council. Unlike the Far Eastern Commission in Japan, which was 
supposed to monitor the occupation of Japan by the representatives from each Allied 
country, these agencies for Germany functioned well to ensure appropriate uniformity 
of action by the Commanders-in-Chief in each zone of occupation and to reach agreed 
1 ^8 decisions on the chief questions affecting Germany as a whole. However, this 
system caused delays in the decision making process and mitigated against a smoother 
transformation of Germany. 
Second, while MacArthur was able to make use of existent Japanese 
institutions such as the government and the presence of the Emperor as a symbol of 
the state head to facilitate cooperation and the smooth implementation of policy, the 
German occupation was required to establish the government from scratch. This 
process was time consuming. Since the first and foremost mission there was the 
"denazification" of German society, the Allies had to dismantle the political and legal 
structures that the Nazi party had created in Germany, and they had to arrest, punish, 
and exclude active Nazis from public life. This left no governmental institutions 
operating. 
Third, tensions among the four occupying powers, especially between the 
Soviet Union and the Western allies, prevented a harmonious occupation and 
disturbed the establishment of central German institutions. The multilateral 
13^ U.S. Department of State, Occupation of Germany- Policy and Progress 1945-46, 
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139 occupation effort had become hopelessly deadlocked by 1947. 
Thus, some historians have considered the occupation of Japan as more 
successful than the one of Germany, noting that Japan's transformation was quicker, 
smoother, and in many ways, easier than Germany's."'^® Things also went more 
slowly in Germany because the German occupation lacked the focused intensity that 
came with America's unilateral control over Japan, where occupation authority was 
centered in one nation and, indeed, one man—MacArthur. This made the 
reconstruction process less troublesome than in Germany, since neither MacArthur 
nor GHQ were obligated to consult with other countries. In fact, Germany did not 
receive complete sovereignty until the end of the Cold War and German reunification 
in 1989 and 1990, whereas Japan regained sovereignty in 1952 with signing of the 
San Francisco Peace Treaty.'^' 
Although the primary aims of occupation were the same, their goals seemed 
different. As MacArthur later referred to the Japanese as 12 years-old, compared to 
the Germans as mature as 45 years-old, the Allied officials saw the Japanese and the 
German differently and treated them differently. The Allies, Westerners, looked down 
on the Japanese, the Orientals, as an uncivilized race and were enthusiastic about 
civilizing Japan with Western values. Thus, the democratization program was 
enforced more intensively in Japan, and the transformation of social system focused 
on a wide range of issues, from the constitution to education and religion. 
This notwithstanding, people and governments of the Allied countries paid 
more attention to and were more supportive to German situation. In fact, MacArthur 
initially received only limited economic aid from the U.S. government for his mission 
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in Japan and for the entire occupation of Japan, he only got $2 billion. The American 
zone in West Germany, with one-fifth the population of Japan, received, per capita, 3 
times the money sent to Tokyo.Fellers described that "the war in the Pacific was 
racial, whereas the war in Europe was political and social."'"'^ So, too, was the 
postwar treatment. While the German occupation focused on political and economic 
reform, GHQ went further in an effort to transform the Japanese people's culture and 
spirit. The Germans had some experience with democracy in the years prior to the 
World War II and they, like the Allies, were Westerners. Japan, on the other hand, was 
perceived as a feudalistic empire, and most of all, they were "Oriental." Thus, the U.S. 
officials thought Japan needed to be civilized and be transformed to the core by the 
Westerners. 
That MacArthur accomplished the aims of occupation in Japan more quickly 
and smoothly than the mission was accomplished in Germany was a great 
achievement particularly as he had to transform a nation whose people were 
completely alien to Westerners. It worked out well for him, because he could 
administer Japan by himself with absolute authority, and his sole leadership was what 
the Japanese needed at the time of defeat. It does not mean that it would have been 
quicker and worked better if another single commander, perhaps Eisenhower, 
operated the occupation of entire Germany unilaterally. The German nationality is 
different from that of the Japanese. MacArthur's mission was successful because all 
the aspects—Japanese national character, the timing of emergency after the war, 
MacArthur's personaUty, and his tactics—matched perfectly. 
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7. The New Constitution 
State under Meiji Constitution Under the old constitution, which was 
established in 1889, during the Meiji era, Japan did not have a parliament constitution. 
Rather, it vested sovereign power in the emperor and divided political power among a 
small set of competing elites. The political parties competed for power with the 
military, the bureaucracy, the leading industrialists ("zaibatsu"), and groups close to 
the emperor. Beginning in 1925, all men over the age of 25 were granted the right to 
vote, but their representatives in the Diet could easily be outmaneuvered because the 
majority party in the Diet did not automatically have the right to form a government. 
Instead, the emperor appointed the prime minister. Nor was the military legally 
subordinate to civilian control. The military exploited this structural failure to the 
fullest. Political freedoms necessary to sustain a democracy, such as freedom of 
speech and assembly, scarcely existed. 
MacArthur later said the new constitution was the single most important 
accomplishment of the occupation of Japan, since it brought Japan freedoms and 
privileges they had never known. The Japanese had never experienced political 
freedom, equality between the sexes, freedom of speech, or Western style human 
rights until May 3, 1947, when the new constitution came into effect. Basic to this 
approach, the constitution declared that the Emperor was not a God but merely the 
symbolic head of the state. It also established that Japan would not participate in war 
for any reasons, and that the feudalistic hierarchy would be abolished. The new 
constitution has directly affected Japanese people's lives ever since. In fact, in over 
sixty years, it has never been amended. No other country in history has a constitution 
made by an other nation. While it is still controversial whether GHQ created it or 
Japanese government did, it is clear that MacArthur ordered, screened, and directed 
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its drafting and implementation. It is also clear that this new constitution helped 
dramatically to change Japan. The Japanese now enjoy freedom and democracy that 
would have been unheard of before the occupation. One would also argue that the 
constitution helped Japan to achieve economical and technological success and a high 
standard of living. 
Thus, establishing the new constitution was significant for both the United 
States and Japan. MacArthur credited this accomplishment to the insistence that 
checks and balances, the fundamental element of democracy, had been established in 
the new political system. "If Japan proceeds firmly and wisely upon the course now 
set, its way may well become the Asian way, leading to the ultimate goal of all 
men—individual liberty and personal dignity—and history may finally point to the 
Japanese Constitution as the Magna Charta of free Asia."''^'* 
Revising Process MacArthur ordered the Shidehara Cabinet to take charge of 
revising Meiji Constitution. The occupiers did not force the Japanese to take the 
American constitution but encouraged them to create their own. So the task was 
initially left in the hands of the Japanese government. However, they took a long time 
and did not include enough change. MacArthur found the proposed revisions 
unsatisfactory and concluded that the government was incapable of proposing 
revisions that would meet the Potsdam requirements.Thus, MacArthur took over 
the initiative and directed GHQ's Government Section, under General Courtney 
Whitney, to draft a constitution to guide the Japanese cabinet. MacArthur wanted to 
include three key principles in the new constitution: 
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l)The Emperor is at the head of the State. His succession is dynastic. His 
duties and powers will be exercised in accordance with the Constitution and 
responsible to the basic will of the people as provided therein. 2) War as a 
sovereign right of the nation is abolished. Japan renounces it as an 
instrumentality for settling its disputes and even for preserving its own 
security. It relies upon the higher ideals which are now stirring the world for 
its defense and its protection. No Japanese Army, Navy, or Air Force will 
ever be authorized and no rights of belligerency, will ever be conferred upon 
any Japanese forces. 3) The feudal system of Japan will cease. No rights of 
peerage except those of the Imperial family will extend beyond the lives of 
those now existent. No patent of nobility will from this time forth embody 
within itself any National or Civic power of Government. Pattern budget 
after British system.'"^® 
MacArthur urged extreme haste and secrecy, and the Government Section in fact 
completed the entire document in just 2 weeks, presenting a draft to the Japanese on 
February 19, 1946. 
As MacArthur insisted, the draft reduced the emperor from a sovereign to a 
mere symbol of the Japanese state and placed the Diet, as representatives of the will 
of the people, at the center of national sovereignty. Equal rights were also granted to 
women with regard to property, marriage, inheritance, and other aspects of family life. 
The most innovative aspect of the constitution was Article 9, which declared the full 
and complete disarmament of Japan and the renunciation of war. The Japanese 
government accepted this document, and on March 6, 1946, MacArthur announced 
that the Emperor and the government of Japan were presenting a new constitution to 
the Japanese people. The constitution's origin was deliberately kept quiet, but the 
awkward phrasing of the document, translated from the original one written in 
English, showed it was thoroughly directed by GHQ.'"^^ 
Thus, unlike the initial policy of the United States, which indicated that the 
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Japanese government should take the initiative in any reform process according to its 
people's will and an inclination to intervene as little as possible, MacArthur 
effectively used his authority in leading the Japanese government to establish their 
148 new constitution. 
Key Provisions of the New Constitution MacArthur made it a priority to 
liberate Japanese women from their state of slavery in a male-dominant social system. 
Prior to the revision of constitution, he immediately revised the election law to give 
women the right to vote on December 17, 1945. At the same time, the voting age was 
lowered from 25 to 20. In Japan, men and women had never been equal. Concubinage 
and family contract marriages, consigning wives to servility, had been lawful. Women 
had been forbidden to own property and they had no economic, legal, or political 
rights. Boys and girls were separated in education. Public school courses had been 
segregated by sex—with the curriculum and texts pitched lower for girls—and there 
had been no colleges for women. Adultery had been lawful for husbands but not for 
wives. The new Diet had to face this form of sexism squarely in an early session. 
Under the new constitution, contract marriage became illegal, and so did 
concubinage. Marriage and divorce statutes were rewritten and liberalized to dictate 
equality for both men and women: women gained equal rights with regard to property, 
inheritance, and other aspects of family life. Public high schools became 
coeducational, and 26 women's universities opened. Women were for the first time 
eligible to be elected for public office, and were to serve as social workers and police 
officers in increasing numbers. Before MacArthur left Japan, two Diet committees 
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would be chaired by women.As an immediate effect, the first free election held on 
April 10, 1946, recorded high turnout rate—78.5% for men and 67% for women—and 
elected 39 female members in the Lower House.MacArthur later said with 
satisfaction, "Of all the reforms accomplished by the occupation in Japan, none was 
• 152 more heartwarming to me than this change in the status of women." 
Supreme power was vested in the Diet, and three separate branches of 
government were established. The prime minister, elected by the upper house of the 
bicameral legislature, would serve for four years; if defeated on an issue, he could 
either ask the lower house to choose a successor or call for new elections. MacArthur 
saw this provision would provide a degree of stability in the government and said that 
"no group within the Diet is going to question the administration of a prime minister 
in an idle fashion if they are going to be forced to stand the expense of a new election 
campaign as a result of their capriciousness." MacArthur regarded the provision for 
amendment by national referendum as one of the significant factors of the new 
constitution. It stated that "if two-thirds of the Japanese electors decide that a change 
needs to be made, it goes into effect." The people themselves thus control their own 
153 constitution and are, in the final analysis, the sovereigns in their own land. 
Educational reform was another essential component of the new constitution. 
The Board of Education Law, passed in July 1948, freed education from the direct 
control of the Ministry of Education and vested authority in the hands of local school 
boards, as was the case in the United States. Decentralization of education was 
viewed as essential to permanent removal of the ability of the government to 
indoctrinate Japanese students in the narrow form of Japanese nationalism that was 
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believed to have sustained support for the war. Thus, early efforts also focused on 
removal of all traces of emperor worship and militarism from the classrooms and 
curriculum. Lacking funds and the time to replace textbooks, teachers and students 
were initially directed to rip out or line through offending languages. Saluting the flag, 
singing the national anthem, and bowing to the emperor's portrait were also 
prohibited. Local occupation troops were dispatched to schools in their districts to 
ascertain that these directives from GHQ were being carried out. GHQ also reformed 
the elementary and secondary school system along U.S. standards and extended 
compulsory, and free, education from 6 to 9 years. GHQ officials knew that the effect 
of education would play out decades later. Thus, in order to make the democratization 
reform long lasting, they concentrated on educating the next generation as they 
wanted future Japanese to be. 
Praise for the New Constitution On the day the constitution came into 
effect, celebratory ceremonies were held nationwide. One hundred thousand people 
gathered in front of the imperial palace, and a Japanese brass band performing in the 
plaza celebrated the occasion by playing The Stars and Stripes Forever. George 
Atcheson, Jr., MacArthur's chief political adviser, referred to willingness of the 
Japanese to adopt an American directed constitution as "the dawn of the age of 
Japan's imitation of things American—not only of American machines but also 
American ideas."'^^ 
At the completion of the draft, MacArthur proudly wrote, "It is undoubtedly 
the most liberal constitution in history, having borrowed the best from the constitution 
of many countries" and "the best standards of a truly parliamentary democracy." The 
form of govenmient was "a combination of American executive system and the 
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British pariiamentary one."'^^ 
In his New Year's remark of 1946, MacArthur mentioned the 
democratization by revising the constitution that "the removal of this national 
enslavement means freedom for the people, but at the same time, it imposes upon 
them the individual duty to think and to act each on his own initiative. It is necessary 
for the masses of Japan to awaken to the fact that they now have the power to govern 
and what is done must be done by themselves."'^^ Further, in the first New Year's 
remark after adopting the new constitution, MacArthur congratulated the Japanese for 
achieving the freedom; 
Your new constitution is now in full effect, and there is increasing 
evidence of a growing understanding of the great human ideals which it is 
designed to serve. Implementing laws have reoriented the entire fabric of 
your way of life to give emphasis to the increased responsibility, dignity and 
opportunity which the individual now holds and enjoys. Government has 
ceased to be totalitarian and has become representative, with its functions 
decentralized to permit and encourage a maximum of individual thought and 
initiative and judgment in the management of community affairs. Control of 
every political segment has been shifted to permit the selection of a new 
leadership of your free choice capable of advancing democratic growth... 
Every Japanese citizen can now for the first time do what he wants, and 
go where he wants, and say what he wants, within the liberal laws of his land. 
This means that you can select your own work, and when you have 
completed it you can choose your own method of relaxation and enjoyment, 
and on your day of rest you can worship as you please, and always you can 
criticize and express your views on the actions of your Government. This is 
liberty... 
The future therefore lies in your hands. If you remain true to the great 
spiritual revolution which you have undergone, your nation will emerge and 
go on—if you accept only its benefits without its obligations, it will wither 
and go under...The way is long and hard and beset with difficulties and 
dangers, but it is my hope and belief and prayer this New Year's Day that you 
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will not falter. 
Joseph Keenan, chief prosecutor of the Tokyo Trial, sent a letter 
congratulating MacArthur. "It seems to me," Keenan wrote, "to be a sound 
combination of the American and British systems of government, leaving necessary 
refinements to the development of the Japanese themselves."'^^ In fact, the new 
constitution had borrowed many aspects from other countries' constitutions. Beate 
Sirota Gordon, an Austrian who grew up in Tokyo, was educated in America and 
worked for Time Magazine as a Japan specialist, came back to Japan after the war as a 
member of the Government Section to draft the new constitution.'^^ She made 
strenuous efforts to include equality of the sexes in the constitution of Japan. In an 
assessment written in the 1990s, she revealed that she gained various ideas from the 
constitutions of countries such as Sweden, Germany, and the Soviet Union especially 
about matters on social welfare.Then she made sure that laws concerning marriage, 
divorce, and adultery were to be revised as part of the program for equality between 
the sexes in Japanese society and family structure. Thus, the old custom of contract 
marriage was forbidden, concubinage was abolished, and Japanese women even 
became able to ask for and receive maternity leave. 
MacArthur noted there was much criticism of his speedy move to ensure the 
enfranchisement of women in light of male sentiment and a perception that women 
were too steeped in the tradition of subservience to their husbands to act with any 
degree of political independence. However, in his reminiscences, MacArthur proudly 
noted that he had enough support from important people to take such a step. President 
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Truman, for example, said, "I am behind MacArthur a hundred percent, that I think 
he's doing an excellent job and he can be absolutely certain I'll back him to the 
finish." Secretary of State Byrnes proclaimed, "I think he is doing a magnificent job 
and that all of us back here are and will continue to support his efforts to the limit of 
our ability, we are all mighty proud of him." Herbert Hoover, commenting on 
MacArthur, said "I think I have a realization, as perhaps no one else has, of the 
difficulties with which you have been confronted and of the amazing service you have 
been to the American people." Finally, historian Mary R. Beard effusively praised 
MacArthur's efforts on behalf of women. 
"There is something in General MacArthur's determination to 
enfranchise the women of Japan indicative of his conception of the family as 
the core or heart of society, and of woman as its prime guardian, which I 
would almost have to go back to Confucius for comparison. That he should 
associate the care and nutrition of the family with political democracy—and 
do this in his own mind, not just by pressure from another mind—gives him a 
standing in my mind—which is at the top of my judgment of statecraft. The 
whole procedure in Japan is so superior in intelligence to the occupation in 
Germany that General MacArthur's leadership shines with brilliant 
illumination."'^' 
Despite the doubters, Japanese women embraced. this reform. More than 
13,000,000 women registered to vote for the first general election of April 10, 1946. 
They were quick to take advantage of other aspects of their new status under the 
constitution. This included finding jobs in professions from which they had been 
previously excluded. For example, in the next five years, about two thousand women 
became police officers. 
The Controversial Article 9 Not only to Japan, but also to the world, the 
"no-war" clause of Article 9 was the most striking feature of the new constitution. The 
MacArthur, Reminiscences, pp.305-306. 
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debate over whether Article 9 permitted or prohibited limited armament for the 
purpose of self-defense has emerged every time Japan faced the possibility of 
participating in any war, from the Korean War till the current war in Iraq. Article 9 
reads as follows: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, 
the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation 
and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air 
forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of 
belligerency of the state will not be recognized.'®^ 
This provision clearly achieved the American goal of demobilization, but 
disputes arose over whether Japan could rearm for the purpose of self-defense. The 
origin of Article 9 has itself been fiercely debated. From MacArthur's note to the 
Government Section, it was clear that he ordered its inclusion in the draft. However, 
MacArthur later insisted that Prime Minister Shidehara proposed it to MacArthur. 
Impressed by unexpected idea from Japanese side, MacArthur happily agreed. Later, 
when MacArthur had to rearm Japan in the face of the growing threat of communism 
and the outbreak of the Korean War, he asserted that Shidehara was the origin of 
Article 9, thus avoiding the criticism for changing the policy. In his reminiscences, 
MacArthur intentionally explained in his 1950 New Year's remarks to the Japanese 
people the details of how he accepted Shidehara's idea, noting that he recommended 
that, in case of need, a defense force be established consisting of ten divisions with 
corresponding sea and air elements. 
Should the course of world events require that all mankind stand to 
arms in defense of human liberty and Japan comes within the orbit of 
immediately threatened attack, then the Japanese, too, should mount the 
maximum defensive power which their resources will permit. Article 9 is 
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based upon the highest of moral ideals, but by no sophistry of reasoning can 
it be interpreted as complete negation of the inalienable right of self-defense 
against unprovoked attack. It is a ringing affirmation by a people laid 
prostrate by the sword, of faith in the ultimate triumph of international 
morality and justice without resort to the sword. 
Asahi Shimbun reported on August 14, 2005 that a correspondence dated 
December 10, 1945 was found that was written by a former ambassador to Italy, 
Toshio Shiratori (who was accused as a war criminal and sentenced to life in prison) 
to Foreign Minister Shigeru Yoshida. Shiratori purportedly sent it from the Sugamo 
Prison to propose the idea of renunciation of war to Prime Minister Shidehara.'^ If 
Shidehara read this correspondence before he met MacArthur on January 24, 1946 to 
discuss the draft, it is possible that MacArthur's account was right. Although a 
detailed investigation has not been made yet, this report shows that the origin of 
Article 9 and its interpretation are still a controversial matter and continues to get 
Japanese people's attention even after sixty years. 
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8. The Turning Point of the Occupation 
Dawn of Communism and the Korean War Once GHQ accomplished 
demobilization smoothly, the priority of the occupation shifted from military matters 
to political ones. MacArthur, as a missionary of democracy, strongly opposed 
communism. And when the Red Scare gripped the United States, MacArthur also 
strictly regulated Japanese communists. For example, he suspended the publishing of 
the journal of the Japanese Communist Party, "Aka Hata," which meant red flag, and 
also suppressed any kind of publication which expressed support for communism. 
Facing the emergence of communist threat nearby, pressure began to build on 
Japan to consider some level of rearmament, because Japan was vulnerable to an 
enemy attack under the Peace Constitution which renounced war. MacArthur was 
determined to shield Japan from neighboring threats and maintain it as a democratic 
country. The United States needed a friendly power in the Far East because Chiang 
Kai-shek's Nationalists were steadily losing ground to Mao Zedong's communists in 
China. GHQ gradually increased civilian and coastal police forces to handle domestic 
security matters. By the time the war broke out in Korea in 1950, MacArthur decided 
to allow Japan to rearm despite the "no-war" clause. Thus, on New Year's Day of 
1950, he announced a new interpretation of Article 9, arguing that Japan needed to 
rearm for self-defense to protect itself from the communist threat in Asia.'^^ In July 
1950, Japan agreed to the U.S. request that they establish a "National Police Reserve" 
of up to 75,000 men, which would function as a paramilitary force to fill the gap 
created by the rapid dispatch of the U.S. occupation forces to Korea.Ironically, 
MacArthur, who devoted all his effort in Japan's demilitarization in the initial period 
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of occupation, now found himself overseeing the creation of a small army. 
In 1952, the National Police Reserve was renamed "National Safety Forces." 
Two years later, it became the "Self Defense Forces" with three branches: Ground, 
Maritime, and Air. For years, the Self Defense Forces helped the U.S. defend Japan 
against a Soviet threat during the Cold War. Beyond self defense, they have engaged 
in disaster relief and United Nations peacekeeping efforts. However, the activities of 
Self Defense Forces abroad have always been controversial among Japanese people: 
should they participate in fighting as a member of international community, even in 
regions where Japan was not involved, or simply stay home and guard the homeland? 
Now that Japan faces a nuclear threat from North Korea, the question whether Self 
Defense Forces can act preemptively has become a serious and urgent debate. Issues 
over Japan's defense still remains problematic because of the vagueness of the 
interpretation of Article 9. 
Economic Recovery Economically, too, the Korean War provided Japan with a 
new start. MacArthur had made efforts in the first stage of the occupation to open 
economic opportunities and spurred the creation of many new companies by breaking 
up the family-owned "zaibatsu," such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, and Yasuda, 
which controlled 75 percent of the country's commerce, raw materials, and transport. 
But it was hard to see the effect immediately.'^^ Facing taxpayers restless with the 
huge costs of the occupation, the U.S. government ultimately instructed MacArthur to 
direct the Japanese government to undertake an economic stabilization program 
designed by Joseph Dodge, a banker from Detroit. The U.S. attempted to ease the 
burden of financial assist to Japan by encouraging the Japanese to promote economic 
development and support themselves. The Dodge Plan, launched in 1949, was 
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followed by massive layoffs of government and industrial employees, increased taxes, 
wage freezes, higher prices for rice, transportation, and other government-subsidized 
goods and services, and reduced public services. This economic recovery program 
had made significant progress by the mid-1950s. In three years, Japan's commerce 
expanded rapidly and Japanese imports from the United States were cut in half. 
Dodge also established a fixed exchange rate of 360 yen to the dollar, undervaluing 
the yen somewhat to stimulate exports by making Japanese manufactures cheaper on 
the world market.In five years, national income had passed the prewar level 
despite a wave of strikes, demonstrations, and sabotage against all these drastic 
reform. 
However, restrictions on Japan's external activities caused serious problems 
in the expansion of Japan's international trade. Because of the absence of a peace 
treaty, the Allies did not allow Japan to trade internationally, which undermined 
efforts to achieve a self-supporting economy. The lack of trade with China was 
particularly devastating. MacArthur argued that the world must allow Japan to trade. 
"If we keep this economic blockade up, more and more will we have to support this 
country. The job of occupation is to restore Japan's production to self-sufficiency. Our 
170 problem is to keep Japan up." 
Ultimately, U.S. orders for military supplies to support the Korean War 
provided the Japanese economy with the boost in external demand needed to 
accelerate economic growth. During 1951 and 1952, U.S. military purchases of 
Japanese products amounted to nearly $800 million per year. By the end of 1954, 
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these purchases totaled about $3 billion.'^' This military spending benefited almost 
every sector of the Japanese economy, from vehicle manufacturing to textiles. 
Consequently, the United States saved Japanese economy not only by reconstructing 
the base of economic structure but also by purchasing war supplies from Japan for the 
war in Korea. 
Toward the Peace Treaty The Korean War provided an impetus to 
Washington to move towards a peace treaty with Japan and accelerated the end of the 
occupation. In fact, MacArthur and State Department had been calling for a peace 
treaty since 1949 because they believed that the continued presence of the U.S. forces 
throughout Japan served as an irritant rather than a force for stability. American public 
opinion, which favored bringing the troops home, also encouraged them to move 
forward on a treaty. As early as in March 1947, MacArthur mentioned in an interview 
with foreign correspondents that "the time is now approaching when we must talk 
172 peace with Japan." He insisted that the job of occupation was coming close to 
completion, and democracy seemed established in Japan. He also favored having the 
United Nations substitute supervision over Japan. Comparing it to the German 
situation, MacArthur said "in Japan there is a functioning Government. But in 
Germany the Government had to be built from the ground up and there is no 
Government to sign the Peace Treaty... Over here there is no problem of what to do 
with Japan." 
In exchange for a peace treaty, the Defense Department and the Joint Chiefs 
of Staff demanded that Japan accept rearmament and the U.S. bases indefinitely. 
Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida agreed to the U.S. demands to create a military force 
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of 300,000 to 350,000 men. Thus, in September 1951, the peace treaty and a separate 
security treaty were signed in San Francisco. Representatives of 48 democratic 
countries witnessed the event. In April 1952, with the enforcement of the treaty, Japan 
regained its sovereignty. 
The U.S.-Japan Security Treaty The security treaty, officially named the 
"Mutual Security Assistance Pact" has been the pillar of the U.S.-Japan relationship 
ever since. It ensured continued U.S. access to bases in Japan in return for a pledge of 
U.S. protection of Japan in the event Japan was attacked. In order to strengthen 
Japan's ties to the West during the Cold War, the treaty of 1952 was revised in 1960, 
and the U.S. and Japan signed the "Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security " 
Under the new treaty, both parties assumed an obligation to maintain and develop 
their capacities to resist armed attack in common and to assist each other in case of 
armed attack on territories under Japanese administration. Significantly, these terms 
stood in contradiction to Article 9 of the Japanese Peace Constitution, which forbade 
the maintenance of "land, sea, and air forces." It also expressed the Japanese people's 
renunciation of "the threat or use of force as a means of settling international 
disputes."It was thus generally understood that Japan could not come to the 
defense of the United States because it was constitutionally forbidden to send armed 
forces overseas. 
The treaty also contained a status-of-forces agreement on the stationing of 
United States forces in Japan, with specifics relating to the provision of facilities and 
areas for their use and regarding the administration of Japanese citizens employed in 
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the facilities. The Agreed Minutes to the treaty specified that the U.S. wanted to 
consult the Japanese government prior to major changes in the American force 
deployment in Japan or to the use of Japanese bases for combat operations other than 
in defense of Japan itself. The treaty also covered the limits of the two countries' 
jurisdictions over crimes committed in Japan by United States military personnel. 
Having American bases all over Japan was always controversial in Japan, 
even though the Japanese remained under U.S. protection. There were massive 
demonstration and rioting by students and trade union members opposing the treaty in 
the 1960s. Currently, there are 47,000 U.S. military personnel in Japan—Army, Navy, 
Air Force, and Marine Corps—and another 5,500 American civilians employed there 
by the U.S. Department of Defense. Every incident of misconduct by U.S. servicemen, 
such as raping Japanese women, has given rise to demand that the United States 
diminish its presence in Japan. 
Tensions have risen especially high in Okinawa, strategically crucial islands 
in the Pacific, which the U.S. occupied until 1972. Okinawa has been a center of 
debates over the American bases in Japan in past because the prefecture of Okinawa is 
densely populated (it has 1,300,000 people) yet, with 27,000 U.S. military personnel, 
is the biggest of all the American bases in Japan. Following a number of incidents 
between Japanese residents and American servicemen, the residents of Okinawa have 
long demanded moving the bases into a less densely populated area or diminishing 
their size."'* The two sides in fact recently agreed to move 8,000 U.S. troops from 
Okinawa to Guam. 
As a result of the occupation and the security treaty, the United States 
maintains the presence in Japan. It has worked effectively as a stabilizer of peace in 
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the East Asia, but, at the same time, it remains problematic because of continuing 
conflicts between local residents and the U.S. military and its servicemen. 
Truman Dismisses MacArthur The Korean War brought another change into the 
occupation of Japan when President Harry Truman designated MacArthur 
Commander of all United Nations forces in Korea. Then on April 11, 1951, shocking 
news struck Japan: Truman had dismissed MacArthur from his position on grounds of 
insubordination. MacArthur was removed from all his commands, including the 
occupation of Japan. 
The Mainichi newspaper described MacArthur's dismissal as "the greatest 
shock since the end of the war."'^^ By this time, the Japanese had come to trust 
MacArthur, and they thought they needed his guidance to recover completely. Thus, 
people felt uncertain at the prospect of sudden independence from the General. Many 
believed they were not simply ready. Even Asahi Shimbun, a liberal newspaper which 
initially opposed Macarthur's policy and once suspended publication on orders of the 
General, indicated doubts. In an editorial entitled "Lament for General MacArthur," 
published on the day after Truman's announcement, the paper stated; 
We have lived with General MacArthur from the end of the war until 
today... When the Japanese people faced the unprecedented situation of 
defeat, and fell into the condition of exhaustion and despair, it was General 
MacArthur who taught us the merits of democracy and pacifism and guided 
us with kindness along this bright path. As if pleased with his own children 
growing up, he took pleasure in the Japanese people, yesterday's enemy, 
walking step by step toward democracy, and kept encouraging us.'^^ 
The whole country was filled with a combination of sorrow and gratitude 
when the time came for MacArthur's departure on April 16. Prime Minister Yoshida 
visited the General to thank him for his great contributions to Japan's reconstruction. 
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Yoshida made a statement on a national broadcast that "the General's 
accomplishments in Japan were one of the marvels of history. It is he who has 
salvaged our nation from post-surrender confusion and prostration, and steered the 
country on the road to reconstruction. It is he who has firmly planted democracy in all 
segments of our society. It is he who has paved the way for a peace settlement. No 
wonder he is looked upon by all our people with the profoundest veneration and 
affection. I have no words to convey the regret of our nation to see him leave."' 
Even the Emperor paid a last visit to the embassy to share a farewell. Two million 
Japanese people lined the route from the embassy to the airport, waving to MacArthur 
and his family with American flags. Some wept. The speakers of both houses of the 
Diet praised the General's righteousness, sympathetic understanding, and intelligent 
guidance. Further, legislators discussed making the General an honorary citizen and 
178 erecting a MacArthur Memorial, or a statue in Tokyo Bay. 
The Japanese people deeply respected and appreciated MacArthur's intense 
devotion to the reconstruction of Japan. Indeed, MacArthur turned down a 
million-dollar offer to publish a memoir because he wanted to devote all his energies 
to Japan's recovery. During the six years of his mission in Japan, he never left Tokyo 
except to attend the proclamation of independence ceremonies in Manila and Seoul 
and for his meeting with Truman on Wake Island to discuss the strategy for the 
Korean situation. Mainichi wrote: 
"MacArthur dealt with Japanese people not as a conqueror but a 
great reformer. He was a noble political missionary. What he gave us was not 
material aid and democratic reform alone, but a new way of life, the freedom 
and dignity of the individual... We shall continue to love and trust him as one 
of the Americans who best understood Japan's position. We wanted his 
further help in nurturing our green democracy to fruition. We wanted his 
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leadership at least until a signed peace treaty had given us a send-off into the 
world community." 
Asahi followed that "We feel as if we had lost a kind and loving father." 
Following his dismissal by the President, MacArthur was not even allowed to 
attend the signing ceremony of the peace treaty in San Francisco on September 8, 
1951, because he was no longer the supreme commander. But making a peace treaty 
with Japan and ending the occupation would not have been possible so quickly 
without MacArthur's tremendous contribution. 
For all the outpouring of respect and gratitude on his departure, however, 
MacArthur's statement at the hearings before the Senate on May 5, 1951 changed the 
way the Japanese people felt about the General. Japanese nationals felt insulted by the 
words of MacArthur expressing his view on the Japanese when he was asked if the 
Japanese could be counted on to defend the freedoms they had gained under the 
occupation: 
Well, the German problem is a completely and entirely different one 
from the Japanese problem. The German people were a mature race. 
If the Anglo-Saxon was say 45 years of age in his development in the 
sciences, the arts, divinity, culture, the Germans were quite as mature. The 
Japanese, however, in spite of their antiquity measured by time, were in a 
very tuitionaiy condition. Measured by the standards of modem civilization, 
they would be like a boy of twelve as compared with our development of 45 
years. 
Like any tuitionary period, they were susceptible to following new 
models, new ideas. You can implant basic concepts there. They were still 
close enough to origin to be elastic and acceptable to new concepts. 
The German was quite as mature as we were. Whatever the German did 
in dereliction of the standards of modem morality, the international standards, 
he did deliberately. He didn't do it because of a lack of knowledge of the 
world. He didn't do it because he stumbled into it to some extent as the 
Japanese did. He did it as a considered policy in which he believed in his 
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own military might, in which he believed that its application would be a 
shortcut to the power and economic domination that he desired... 
But the Japanese were entirely different. There is no similarity. One of 
the great mistakes that was made was to try to apply the same policies which 
were so successful in Japan to Germany, where they were not quite so 
successful, to say the least. They were working on a different level. 
The Japanese people considered this statement insulting, and it effectively 
brought end to "MacArthur fever" in Japan. Although MacArthur publicly ordered his 
troops to treat the Japanese equally and with respect and to leam from them, the 
testimony indicated that he saw the Japanese differently in his mind. The Japanese 
people felt terribly disappointed by his private view, because they thought of him as a 
father figure, not just a political figure. They felt ashamed about how thoroughly they 
had trusted him and how submissively they had obeyed him, while he held such 
negative views of the Japanese people. The shock in Japan was so great that the plan 
for building his memorial was abandoned; no statue was ever built, and designation of 
honorary citizen had never come to pass. Thus, although MacArthur had made a great 
contribution to Japan's recovery from the war, he diminished the reputation and 
1 0 1  
admiration he had built in Japan for six years by his demeaning statement. 
The U.S. occupation left an ambiguous legacy in Japan. However, Japan has 
never amended what many perceive as an artificial constitute, and continue to struggle 
with the interpretation of Article 9 At the same time, the Japanese do not know how 
to deal with controversies over the U.S. military bases throughout Japan. Japan's 
economy has become strong enough to compete with the U.S., but Japanese prime 
ministers have always been loyal to American leaders and have tried to get along with 
them, even if public opinion in Japan opposed them, for example for the recent 
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decision to send the Self-Defense troops to Iraq. Since the end of the war, the 
Japanese have worked hard trying to catch up the American level of economy, 
technology, modem culture, and standard of living. And the Japanese exceeded the 
Americans at some sectors such as automobile industry, but Japan continues to look 
up to the United States. Ultimately, Japan has remained MacArthur's children even 
fifty years after achieving sovereignty. 
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9. The Meaning of the Occupation 
Why It Was Successful The occupation of Japan was successful in large 
part because of MacArthur's ability to read the mind and psyche of the Japanese 
people. As he handled every situation he considered the psychology of the humiliated 
and defeated people of Japan and made proper decisions, the most significant of 
which was preserving the Emperor. Second, the occupation was a success because 
MacArthur had the authority to make policies without interference. If he had to 
consult other Allies, he might not have been able to enact his policies, no matter how 
wise. Given a free hand to act, he accomplished all the initial aims smoothly and in a 
short period. Third, the occupation went smoothly because of the foresight of the 
Allies in utilizing the existing Japanese institutions of government and the Emperor. 
They made effective use of existing authorities, which was impossible in Germany 
because the Allies had to abolish all Nazis that led all the German authorities, and that 
was why it took longer there. Finally, the unexpected cooperation of Japanese officials 
and the general population, in response to the tolerant policies and the generous 
activities of the GHQ, made the reconstruction process easier. Whether as nationals of 
a vanquished country, or by their nature to obey authority, the Japanese submitted to 
orders of the occupation forces. 
The occupation succeeded because each role was distinguished clearly, and both 
parties understood and played their roles properly—the Allies as rulers, and the 
Japanese as the conquered. MacArthur's charismatic and strong authoritarian 
personality provided precisely the ruler that the Japanese needed. In an address to the 
House of Representatives of the United States on April 19, 1951, MacArthur showed 
his respect toward the Japanese and praised their cooperation with the occupation 
forces: 
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The Japanese people since the war have undergone the greatest 
reformation recorded in modem history. With a commendable will, eagerness 
to learn, and marked capacity to understand, they have, from the ashes left in 
war's wake, erected in Japan an edifice dedicated to the primacy of 
individual liberty and personal dignity, and in the ensuing process there has 
been created a truly representative government committed to the advance of 
political morality, freedom of economic enterprise and social justice. 
Politically, economically and socially Japan is now abreast of many free 
nations of the earth and will not again fail the universal trust. That it may be 
counted, upon to wield a profoundly beneficial influence over the course of 
events in Asia is attested by the magnificent manner in which the Japanese 
people have met the recent challenge of war, unrest, and confusion 
surrounding them from the outside, and checked communism within their 
own frontiers without slightest slackening in their forward progress... I know 
of no nation more serene, orderly, and industrious—nor in which higher 
hopes can be entertained for future constructive service in the advance of the 
182 human race. 
MacArthur believed one of the things that made the occupation a success was 
the public respect he gave them: "my insistence that we wanted to learn from the 
Japanese as well as teach them. It had a great deal to do with restoring a sense of 
dignity and purpose in their people, and as they regained self-respect and pride, they 
approached an exchange of ideas with avidity and good will. This mutual respect 
became the foundation of the basic esteem our two peoples came to have for one 
another—and enabled the occupation to write a unique and warmly human chapter of 
world history."'^^ Even if he held racially-biased and paternalistic attitudes toward 
the Japanese privately, his official attitude appealed to and was appreciated by the 
Japanese people. His public approach made them willingly cooperate with the 
occupation forces. 
It was also important that the Japanese appreciated the work of the 
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occupation authority, even though it came about as a result of losing the war. The 
occupation forces benevolently helped the Japanese with supplies of food, clothes and 
medicine when they were suffering from starvation, poverty and exhaustion. The new 
constitution liberated Japanese people from their state as "subjects" of the empire. 
Over time, the Japanese came to enjoy freedom in a civilized environment and a high 
standard of living. 
Why It Was Necessary Occupying Japan was necessary for the United 
States not only to punish the defeated country and secure control there but to establish 
a friendly country and the presence of the U.S. military bases in the Pacific. By 
occupying Japan and painting Japan with American colors, America successfully 
transformed Japan from a menace into one of America's strongest allies. The alliance 
with Japan gave the U.S. an expanded presence in the Pacific. As MacArthur insisted, 
1S4 "the U.S. frontier lay in Asia." This became increasingly important as American 
relations with the Soviet Union deteriorated and the cold war took shape. The Korean 
War, in particular, focused the American government's attention in the need to 
establish Japan as a model of a democratic government and an outpost of American 
influence in Asia. 
For Japan, in hindsight, occupation was necessary. Being occupied was very 
humiliating, but the Japanese had no option as a consequence of losing the war. 
Beyond that, however, Japan needed help to recover. The Japanese needed to rebuild 
the country from a circumstance of despair after the devastation of the war. They also 
needed a new government and a new leader. In addition, Japan needed aid by the 
Allies to feed its people at a time of serious hunger and poverty. If the Allies did 
nothing but disarm the Japanese and punish war criminals, the whole nation of Japan 
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might have collapsed. If MacArthur had not changed the old feudalistic social system, 
it would have been impossible for Japan to be a respected member of international 
community and one of its most industriali2ed countries, as they are now. 
Although there remain several problems and controversies as a legacy of the 
occupation, overall, the occupation of Japan was necessary for both the United States 
and Japan, because it established the foundation of close ties between the two 
countries, which now share the realm of superpowers and lead the world in areas of 
economy and technology. For the Americans, the occupation of Japan was successful 
because they changed Japan in the direction they wanted, by disarming, demobilizing, 
and democratizing a formerly militaristic and imperial enemy. Within a few years 
after its defeat, Japan had recovered from devastation and despair, established a 
growing and successful economy, and become one of America's most cooperative 
allies. America successfully established its presence in the Pacific, at least in part 
through keeping a large number of military bases throughout Japan. 
Looking Ahead Fifty years have passed since the independence from the 
occupation, and some problems persist. First, the interpretation of Article 9 in the new 
constitution, which has always generated controversy, has resurfaced now, as Japan 
faces the nuclear threat of North Korea. Whether or not Japan can take preemptive 
action varies depending on how one interprets the clause which ambiguously declares 
the renunciation of war. Secondly, the generation that experienced the occupation 
blames America's influence for what they perceive as the absence of "Japanese 
morality" among Japan's young people. They complain that America's 
democratization program replaced the Japanese people's spirit with an American 
standard. They criticize the younger generations for being individualistic, for showing 
no respect to elders or parents, and for lacking a harmonious approach with others. 
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However, it is incumbent on the Japanese people to adjust to the framework 
established by the occupation. They must be able to teach younger generations if 
something important if missing for them. The Japanese should not blame everything 
on the occupation and American influence. 
Now that over sixty years have passed, it is getting difficult for the World 
War II generation to keep telling young people about the war and the experiences they 
had in post war years. Many people who survived the war are now getting old and 
dying, and young generations are not interested in the war and the occupation. 
However, this is very important especially for the Japanese to keep telling the stories 
to the next generations to let them leam how their country had changed by the war, by 
the involvement of the United States, and how their country has grown with 
Americans' guidance. The loss of World War 11 and the following occupation 
represent the most significant turning point of modem Japanese history. This period is 
significant for the United States as well, because this is when they established the 
basis for the present U.S.-Japan relationship. 
1 oc 
A Japanese movie "MacArthur's Children" portrays the life in a small 
town on an island called Awajishima during the early period of occupation. Based on 
a novel by Yu Aku, which was a fictional account of his own experience, the movie 
starts with a scene in a classroom with children around ten years old. They are erasing 
some parts of their textbooks using ink and brushes, which were usually used for 
calligraphy, with the teacher's instruction. This scene represents the implementation 
of the GHQ's order that all schools erase "inappropriate" phrases from the textbooks, 
such as expressions praising the Emperor as a God, passages encouraging militaristic 
or nationalistic ideas, or the ones opposing the Allies. On the day when the occupation 
185 Masahiro Shinoda, MacArthur's Children, Japan Herald, 1984. 
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troops landed on the island, children were excited to see "Yankees" coming, but adults 
were anxious and fearful. A young female teacher tells her students "Our nation is 
occupied now because we lost the war. But, please do not let your spirit get occupied 
by them." And she starts teaching English with tears in her eyes. "I am a boy, I am an 
American..." and the children repeat the phrase. It shows that children were just 
enjoying the changes without knowing what was really going on, but adults, like this 
teacher, had to deal with feelings of humiliation and sorrow of the defeat and with 
their pride as Japanese. 
People of the old generation who lived through this period have complex 
feelings about the war and the following occupation. Yet they have not, in general, 
discussed or expressed their thoughts in public. For the most part, as noted, the 
conquered Japanese people appreciated the humanitarian activities and 
democratization programs by the occupation forces. At the same time, they wish they 
could have maintained some aspects of their traditional Japanese morality instead of 
replacing it totally with American values of freedom and individualism. The following 
stories are personal experiences and thoughts about the occupation from three 
individuals who experienced the war and the occupation. From my observation, the 
people represent views common to their generation: 
Izumi Mogi, 80 years old now, was 19 when General Mac Arthur and his 
troops landed in Japan. She was Tokyo native, but was evacuated to an outskirt of the 
city, avoiding the massive raids that struck the heart of Tokyo. She barely realized the 
nation's defeat on the day of surrender, she recalls. Although she heard the Emperor 
speaking to the people for the first time on the radio, and knew that Japan lost the war, 
she could not believe it because she still saw B-29 airplanes flying above on the day 
of surrender. She lost two brothers in the war; her house was burned by an air raid; 
86 
food was scarce, and she just remembers the hardship of every single day. To her, 
MacArthur's arrival seemed like something happening somewhere outside of her 
world. 
Izumi believes she learned to cooperate with and help others through the war 
time experience. But she admits that she still wonders why all these innocent young 
people, including her brothers, had to die. That feeling makes her visit Yasukuni 
Shrine, a monumental shrine in Tokyo where the war dead are buried, every year to 
mourn for them. She blames the Japanese government of the time for accepting every 
order the Americans made during the occupation, although she understands they had 
to. She did not like seeing Japanese people change their attitudes and values so 
quickly or their following, or copying, the Americans. She thinks that Americans 
occupied not only the land, but also the core of the people's spirit. As noted, she is 
among many Japanese nationals who believe that the country lost traditional values of 
Japanese morality, which embraced unity and harmony among people, when they 
adopted the American values of democracy, freedom, and individualism. Now many 
Japanese argue that Japan lost its nationality with the loss of the war. It was good to 
adopt democracy and equality in society, Izumi says, but she wishes the Japanese 
people could have maintained some traditional values and national characteristics. 
Instead, she thinks, they were just totally Americanized. She insists this has had a bad 
effect on the young generations who will control the future. 
Indeed, the Japanese have acted exactly the way MacArthur predicted; the 
Japanese followed the leader. They always needed authority to follow, and they would 
do what majority did. The Emperor ordered his people to listen to MacArthur, so they 
did. Putting so much focus on adopting a new, democratic social system following the 
Izumi Mogi, Thoughts on the Postwar Experience, January, 2006, correspondence 
to the writer. 
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guidance by tlie occupation authorities, the Japanese people failed to preserve their 
traditional way of thinking or values. 
Shigeru Kobayashi, now 75 years old, is only a bit more sanguine in his 
interpretation. He recalls that GHQ officers often came over to his school to inspect 
and instruct his teachers. He believes that GHQ tried to pursue their aim to demobilize 
and democratize Japan mainly by reforming education. They focused on teaching 
young generations with new idea of democracy so that Japan would not become an 
America's enemy again in the future. Now, Shigeru thinks, the Japanese people of his 
generation can see the remains of the GHQ's education in current Japan. In that sense, 
he thinks America's occupation policy was proved successful for Americans in 
maintaining Japan as a favorable ally of the United States. 
But like Izumi, Shigeru is pessimistic about the current situations in Japan. 
He complains that people of younger generations have become more individualistic 
and do not seem like to care about others or respect elderly people any more. He 
insists that the Japanese way of thinking, which valued family and respected ancestors 
and parents, worked well to keep the order of society as well as to hold family ties. 
But GHQ saw that kind of social structure as feudalistic and they took it away in their 
democratizing program. Thus, the Japanese ceased to value those ideas. 
During the occupation period, the people of Japan had no rights to criticize or 
oppose to the occupation policies as citizens of the defeated country. Even though 
they achieved a constitutional freedom of expression, opposing activities or 
publications were strictly controlled by the GHQ. They could not express their 
dissatisfaction at the time. They had no choice but to obey everything the GHQ 
ordered. In the long term, by and large, Shigeru thinks that majority of the Japanese 
have appreciated the United States for bringing democracy to Japan and helping to 
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recover from the aftermath of the war. However, he admits that, after sixty years have 
passed, it is inevitable that dissatisfaction has emerged. He just wishes his generation 
could reserve traditional aspects of Japanese morality for the next generation. 
Ronald Vanderschaaf, a native of Iowa then 23 years old, was stationed in an 
Army base called Camp Drake outside of Tokyo during the occupation. His duty at 
Camp Drake was to handle office work dealing with the repatriation process of 
Korean nationals in Japan. Although he had no direct involvement with MacArthur 
during his mission, Ronald recalls the negative impression about the General as an 
"American dictator in foreign land," who had a free hand to rule a defeated foreign 
country. However, Ronald thinks MacArthur's attitudes were necessary and suited 
well in the situation. Japan needed a strong dictator to follow in the period of despair. 
When the Emperor lost his divine power, they needed someone to replace him. To fit 
that spot, the leader of the occupation had to be a dictator, and MacArthur's strong 
personality suited that spot perfectly. 
Ronald appreciates the opportunity to live in Japan in that period. Because of 
the Japanese atrocities during the war, he says, all Americans hated the Japanese, and 
they believed all the Japanese were bad. However, by going to Japan, he found the 
people of Japan "were just like us. We were the same human beings." Getting close to 
his 80s now, he still thinks it was one of the most important things he did in his life. 
While he was serving in Japan, he says, he also learned a lot from the Japanese and 
their life styles, including how to appreciate the natural beauty of the seasons, flowers, 
plants, and rocks, from Japanese ways of arranging those things with state of 
simplicity. Thereafter, he became interested in different cultures and peoples. Now 
after retiring as the principal of a middle school, he has been taking care of and 
Shigeru Kobayashi, Thoughts on the Postwar Experience, ¥ehY\xaLry,20Q&, 
correspondence to the writer. 
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making friends with people from ail around the world—Mexico, Hungary, Romania, 
South Africa and of course, Japan through his volunteer work of teaching English in a 
1 little town Holland, Michigan. 
Each individual who experienced the war and postwar days has his or her 
own thoughts and opinions; some should be shared, some should be discussed, and 
some should be reconsidered. Yet, as noted, many people who lived this period have 
not expressed themselves well. Perhaps it was because the experience was so personal 
or too sad to recall. However, it is necessary to share those thoughts and keep telling 
the stories of their valuable experiences to the people of subsequent generations in 
various ways—by telling, writing, or making films—to inform young people about one 
of the most significant events of their country's history. 
Ronald Vanderschaaf, Thoughts on the Postwar Experience, February, 2006, 
correspondence to the writer. 
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Conclusion 
General MacArthur was wise to maintain the institution of the emperor. He 
understood that the Japanese people needed a spiritual leader during a period of 
traumatic change and despair. By his wise judgments, his mission to disarm and 
democratize Japan was accomplished quickly and smoothly. MacArthur guided the 
Japanese through reconstruction of the aftermath of the war providing them with food 
and medicine. Within a few years, the United States achieved the transformation of a 
former enemy into an ally. Some elements of the occupation remain controversial and 
problematic, including the interpretation of Article 9 of the new constitution; the 
move to rearm to respond to the threat of communism and the Korean War; the 
decision of not punishing Emperor Hirohito as a war criminal; the issue of keeping 
American bases throughout Japan, and the influence of American values on Japanese 
culture. Nevertheless, MacArthur established the foundation for the reemergence of 
Japan and the current U.S.-Japan relationship through his six years' work in Japan. 
This is why MacArthur's occupation of Japan was significant. 
MacArthur deserves credit for introducing the American values of democracy, 
freedom and equality into Japan, and for establishing the base for the country to 
become one of the most affluent and industrialized countries in the world. For 
Japanese women, achieving opportunities to participate in the society with equal 
rights with men was an especially significant event. It is hard to imagine what it 
would have been like had the Allies not occupied and reformed Japan. If the 
commander had not been MacArthur, Japan might also be very different today. 
As noted, not all Japanese people would praise his work entirely. The elder 
generations who experienced and remember the hardships of the wartime, still have 
complex feelings for America's occupation; they witnessed the nation changed 
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dramatically after the war. But it is the task of those who mourn the loss of traditional 
values to keep telling subsequent generations of Japanese the stories of their hard 
times—what they lost, what they gained, what the Allies changed—and teach young 
generations what they want to maintain in Japanese values. Furthermore, it is up to the 
Japanese government and policy intellectuals to adjust MacArthur's legacy if there is 
something they think does not fit in the current world situation. Five decades later, it 
is not appropriate to keep blaming every negative aspect of Japanese society on the 
occupation by the United States. 
Historian John Dower says "World War 11 did not really end for the Japanese 
until 1952."'^^ In the sense that the Japanese are still debating over legacies of the 
occupation continue to face accusations regarding their actions in the Pacific during 
the war, their World War II might not be totally over yet. The Japanese government 
has to tell people the truth about the history and admit everything Japanese military 
leaders and troops did abroad during the war. The failure to do so is causing hostility 
among the Chinese people against the Japanese even now. The Germans have been 
honest about the Nazis' wrongdoings. The Japanese citizens should also know the 
facts, honestly admit past mistakes, and show respect and sincere contrition to the 
victims. That is the key to building better relationships in the future. Japan must leam 
from history to improve attitudes and progress. 
When considering the relationship between the U.S. and Japan, the Japanese 
cannot ignore MacArthur's accomplishments. He is one of the most significant 
Americans in Japanese history. The rapid growth of Japan's economy and industry 
might never have happened without MacArthur's guidance during the occupation. 
Unfortunately, MacArthur ultimately diminished the respectful relationship he had 
Dower (1999), p.25. 
92 
with the Japanese, but, we should value his contributions to Japan's reconstruction 
and for building the base of the firm relationship between the two big countries in 
present world. The latter contribution is particularly noteworthy following a brutal 
war in which peoples of both sides demeaned and hated each other. MacArthur's work 
during the occupation helped to remove that sentiment from the people's minds, 
helped the Japanese recover, and liberated them from a feudalistic social system. 
In sum, the occupation of Japan and MacArthur's contribution were 
significant in the history of both Japan and the United States, and it remains 
meaningful to the present day, as it established the foundation of the U.S.-Japan 
relationship and for Japan's role as a leader of the world's economy and guardian of 
security in the Pacific. Sixty years have passed since the end of the war, and the 
legacy of the occupation is still alive. Some aspects remain controversial, some should 
be adjusted to the current situation. It is important now to reconsider the meaning of 
the occupation. MacArthur's legacy includes Japan's conversion from a militaristic 
monarchy to a stable democracy, its mixed form of parliamentary democracy, the 
liberation of Japanese women, and the peace constitution. MacArthur also laid the 
foundation for Japan's phenomenal post-war economic growth and its close 
relationship with the United States. Historians have pointed to the irony of a 
right-wing military commander with a decidedly imperial style bringing democracy 
and the liberation of women to Japan. Perhaps as much as anything else, however, it 
was his imperial bearing that enabled him to effect such changes. In the end, he was 
the right man for the job. 
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